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MORALITY AND RELIGION.

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PART II.

(PART I IN JULY NUMBER).

In the life or conduct of man there are distinguishable three main grades or stages; viz., that of Utility, that of Morality, and that of Religion. These stages are not to be conceived as successive in time like Comte's stages of human progress, the theological metaphysical and positive, but rather as rising above one another in rank, or in increased conformity with the fullness of truth.

In the Utilitarian stage, the lowest of the three, the standard of conduct, in its best form, is constituted of rules promotive of the security, perfection and pleasure of men, as individuals and communities. Pleasure is estimated chiefly by quantity, certainty and endurance. Utilitarianism claims its standard as the result of generalization from experience,—not from the experience of one generation only, but of successive generations,—and acknowledges no indebtedness to a revelation. Moreover,

* For Part I see July number of Review and Expositor.

it supposes that all authority is in its rules or standard of action. It generally recognizes no authority in a personality above its standard; or, at any rate, no authoritative personality distinct from man or human society. It makes no account of a Supreme Person, conceived as the Creator of man, of all the conditions of his existence, and the laws of utility, and as being therefore the first and only real source of authority. The emotions peculiar to the Utilitarian stage of life are chiefly but not wholly interested feelings; as the feelings of fear and hope, fear of evil or punishment, and hope of advantage or welfare. To these interested feelings the disinterested feeling of sympathy joins itself. It often powerfully reinforces the former; but sometimes powerfully resists them. The pure disinterested feeling of duty or obligation, however, receives no real recognition in Utilitarianism. True, Utilitarians often speak of the feeling of obligation; but what they generally mean by that is, not the disinterested feeling of obligation, properly so called, but the feeling of fear or the "feeling of coercion," or a strong conviction of advantage. They use the name, but entirely change the thing. Utilitarianism considers what men can do of their own power; and supposes that they are capable, in themselves, of fulfilling its ideals. It contemplates mainly the present state of human existence.

Next above the Utilitarian stage of life is the Moral. Morality is not exclusive of, or entirely distinct from, the principles of utility, but rather takes them up into itself and adds to them. The additions it makes are not unimportant. The standard of conduct enjoined by morality is largely identical with the standard of utility; but morality is elevated by a clear and important grade above utility, in its recognition of authority as seated not in its standard, or in any law or ideal considered in itself, and not in any man or combination of men, but in God the Creator of men and the world and all the laws of human happiness and good. Morality includes, above utility, the

notion and belief of the personal Creator as the supreme moral sovereign. It adopts for its own the rules of utility; yet regards their authority not as original, but as derived, or as consisting in the fact that they are the ordinations of the Creator. In utility, obedience to laws or rules is advantageous, is productive of earthly happiness and welfare for the individual and society; disobedience is productive of pain and loss. If we would obtain real good for ourselves and others, we *must* follow the acknowledged and established standard or code. In morality, however, obedience to the same laws is seen to be not only advantageous, but also peculiarly binding or obligatory. It is not only seen that, if we would obtain real good, we *must* follow certain rules; but it is also seen that we *must* obtain real good. Above the necessity of utility is this other distinct and peculiar necessity, moral necessity. This mode of necessity is the authority properly so called of law. It is perceived to be in law from the relation law holds to the will of the Creator. Disobedience to law is not only followed by loss and regret, but also by ill-desert and remorse. The primary moral emotion is the pure disinterested feeling of duty. This emotion, as before remarked, has no real place and acknowledgment in the life of utility. It is not fear of punishment or the mere conviction of advantage or of indispensableness. It is the conviction binding us to laws of conduct considered especially as ordained by the Creator. Certainly the feeling of duty is often associated with the interested feelings of fear and hope, and with the disinterested feeling of sympathy; but it is in character clearly distinct from these. Morality, like utility, has its foundation independent of Revelation. Its views of the Supreme Being and of the standard of conduct are obtained by the human intelligence, through the light of nature. Its peculiar cognitions and emotions are of nature, not of Revelation.. Morality takes much the same view of human capability as utility.

The third and highest stage of human life is the Religious. Religion does not exclude, is not foreign to, the true principles of utility and morality, but fully accepts them for itself. Just as morality embraces the principles of utility, so religion embraces the principles of morality. As to standard and the measure of truth comprehended, the bounds of utility, morality and religion may be compared to three concentric circles. The innermost is that of utility; the next outer is that of morality, which includes utility and a certain area besides; the outermost is that of religion, which includes utility and morality and a definite additional area. Religion, as was before observed, is especially a remedial system. It conceives man as in a state of moral degradation and alienation from God, and is concerned chiefly with the means of recovery or the "plan of salvation."

Religion has several points of superiority over both utility and morality.

1. In the contributions it makes, through its revelations, to the knowledge of the highest standard of human action, or to the intellectual conditions of the most useful and most moral life. Religion makes additions of matter to the best standards of action attainable by the unaided human intellect. In important instances, in regard to both private and social morality, it makes clear and precise what without it would be obscure and indeterminate; as for example, in the institutions of marriage and the Sabbath. Again, religion enlarges and improves the conception of God.

2. Another matter of superiority in religion over utility and morality is its greater power and success in practically carrying out what are admitted by all to be principles of the best standards of human action. Utility and morality have always been greater in their standards and ideals of life, than in their power to bring men to the practical fulfillment of them. Indeed, in this latter respect, they have always been distinguished by con-

spicious and indisputable failures. If they had been and were as capable and successful in practice as in theory, they would leave little or no space and requirement for the most distinctive provisions of religion. But their practical weakness and failures have been the chief occasion of the offices of religion. By its supernatural energies, religion meets this marked defect of utility and morality. It vitalizes them. By its touch it tones up and braces their emotions, convictions, purposes. In a word, it supplies them with indispensable help to the practical realization of their own ideals.

This claim for religion, however, has been most vehemently denied, not only by ill-informed and angry sceptics, but by the most refined utilitarians and moralists. Some of these contend that mankind can be elevated and maintained in the highest excellence of character and happiness solely by the tuition of utilitarianism, especially in its principles of sympathy and unselfish devotion to the common good, as well as, indeed better than, by any mode of revelational religion. In his essay on the "Utility of Religion," Mr. J. S. Mill remarks: "The sense of unity with mankind, and a deep feeling for the general good, may be cultivated into a sentiment and a principle capable of fulfilling every important function of religion and itself justly entitled to the name." He immediately adds: "I will now further maintain, that it is not only capable of fulfilling these functions, but would fulfil them better than any form whatever of supernaturalism. It is not only entitled to be called a religion: it is a better religion than any of those which are ordinarily called by that title."¹ This ideal utilitarianism is called by Mr. Mill and others the "religion of humanity." But if the "religion of humanity" by itself alone can accomplish so much for mankind, it seems never yet to have proved its power by its successes. Mr. Mill's view is a conjecture certainly without considerable historical support. Neither

1 *Three Essays on Religion*, p. 110.

has refined Utilitarianism, combined with the forces of morality, especially with the powerful feeling of obligation, properly so called, signalized itself by its accomplishments in bringing men to the practice and enjoyment of its ideals, or by proving its possibilities of equality or superiority to supernatural religion. History does not confirm the claims set up for utility and morality taken alone. On the contrary, it appears to confirm the pretensions of the religion of the Bible. And at the present time it seems unquestionable that, in an open and free field, the only agency that possesses the enterprise, the zeal, the organic power, the consecrated material means, the self-denial, the love of mankind, the personal heroism, the persistent, unflagging purpose, for successful operations towards the moral elevation of degraded and heathen communities and nations, is this same religion.

3. A very important element in the superiority of religion is its presentation of a unique person incarnate, as a teacher and example, and as an object of love and trust. Through this person especially comes the higher revelation of moral truth and of God which we have just spoken of; and the great moral energy attributed to religion is especially inherent in him.

This person is not only a preacher of the moral law, but is a perfect model of the practice and character required by it. The highest moral law or ideal is not only taught by him, but in him is also exemplified, is incarnated, "appears drawn out in living characters." Religion then offers not an abstract law or ideal alone for guidance, but offers much more than this—the visible embodiment of a perfect moral ideal in the living practicing person. It therefore has all the advantage that subsists in the superiority of the personal over the impersonal; that subsists in a manifest living pattern of law and truth over mere abstract law and truth.

Again, this person is supposed not only to teach moral law and truth by his word and perfect example, but also

to bear in himself moral life or power for gracious communication; he not only instructs men in what they ought to do, but by the impartation of moral energy makes them capable of doing it.

A peculiarity of religion and feature of its distinctive excellence, is its assignment of so great importance to *faith*. The faith of religion consists principally of love and reliance. It is the bond of connection between men and the sublime teacher of moral truth and bearer of moral power; it is the channel for the flow of this power from him to them. The indubitable stress laid upon faith by religion corresponds to its conception of the great moral feebleness and need of men, and of the adequate and perfect provision in Jesus to meet their deficiency.

But many critics have pointed particularly to the eminence given by religion to faith as an evidence not of superior worth but of inferior. They have compared faith favorably with works; they have contrasted it with the "loveliness and beauty of character"; have declared it to be far below the love of truth; have denied to it morality or virtue. The animadversions of opponents seem in many instances to rise from an imperfect knowledge of the nature and function of faith as taught by religion.

The faith of religion cannot be properly said to lack virtue, or to be something different from virtue. Rather, it is itself a mode of virtue, even of the highest virtue; because it is love for and reliance upon a being of perfect moral excellence and perfect saving moral power. Faith cannot rightly be opposed to character. On the contrary, it must be regarded as one of the best evidences and exhibitions of character. Nothing more clearly and certainly reveals what a man is than the men whom he loves and to whom he attaches himself. If a man loves the best men and unites himself to them, he cannot be a bad man and opposed to truth. As far as his devotion goes, he is a good man, he possesses the impulses of good char-

acter. Further, religious faith must not be supposed alien to moral works; since it is itself an internal good work of the highest order. What virtuous action is man capable of that is superior to ardent and earnest affection for and reliance upon a person of incomparable moral excellence and plenary power of moral salvation? However high religion may exalt faith, yet its final purpose in all this seems to be that faith shall serve as a means to good works. Faith is put before and above all outward works, because it is conceived to be the mode of appropriating the necessary and proffered moral help to the most complete performance of such works; in short, its chief end is the practical moral advancement and perfection of the believer. On the other hand, unbelief is degraded by religion with corresponding force of condemnation, because it is interpreted as repugnance to a teacher and pattern of moral perfection and refusal of his needed and offered moral aid and redemption. But it must be admitted that, if men be not considerably defective in moral character and practice, as religion assumes they are, and if Jesus be not a morally perfect example and propitiation, and possess not moral virtue to communicate to men and thereby to make them sounder and stronger, then religion is wrong in giving such distinction to faith.

4. Religion is superior to utility and morality in its pledge of eternal life and rewards. Religion is not like them, in having only the promise of the life that now is, but has also the promise of the life that is to come. What I have here specified as a particular excellence of religion has however by many, but especially by the highest order of Utilitarians, been emphatically declared to be not a point of superiority, but of inferiority. It is, in their view, not only problematical and uncertain, or something which religion can never make good, but is, even as an ideal, a point of inferiority.

Particularly against the promise of future rewards for well-doing in this life, do these high Utilitarians inveigh. This promise, they argue is an appeal and incitement to the selfishness of men; whereas the highest mode of human culture is undoubtedly that which tends to weaken the selfish propensities and to develop the unselfish, to displace the interested love of virtue by the disinterested, to lead men to value virtue for itself, or as an end in itself and not as a means to reward. Says Mr. Mill: "Even the Christ of the Gospels holds out the direct promise of reward from heaven as a primary inducement to the noble and beautiful beneficence towards our fellow-creatures which he so impressively inculcates. This is a radical inferiority of the best supernatural religions compared with the Religion of Humanity; since the greatest thing which moral influences can do for the amelioration of human nature, is to cultivate the unselfish feelings in the only mode in which any active principle in human nature can be effectually cultivated, namely by habitual exercise: but the habit of expecting to be rewarded in another life for our conduct in this, makes even virtue itself no longer an exercise of the unselfish feeling.'"²

There is an important principle pertaining to the promise of future rewards which utilitarian moralists, and many others of other schools, seem never to have considered. Whether the promise of rewards is an excellence or a fault of a moral system, or a religion, depends altogether upon the character of the rewards offered. This principle the devotees of the "religion of humanity" have plainly failed to take account of, and this failure takes all point from their criticism. If a religion promises its followers, as a reward, what would be a gratification to their selfish or lower passions; if, for a life of strenuous self-denial and benevolence, it gave, as the religion of Mahomet, the promise of relaxation and the delights

2 Three Essays on Religion, p. 111.

of lower indulgence—a paradise for the selfish and voluptuary; then surely its promise would be a “radical inferiority.” But it hardly need be said that this is not the character of the rewards promised by the religion of the Gospels. Its primary reward, as is perfectly clear, is virtue itself. It rewards virtue by virtue.³

Contrary to the presumptions of superficial criticism, it really offers nothing to selfishness. It proposes as a reward for excellence in this life, a yet higher degree of the same excellence. What is best here, in the relation of man to man, it promises in the hereafter to make better, to make perfect. Among the main features of the future life of rewards and happiness portrayed in the Bible, is a closer relation to God, with a more perfect service of him—a service of more intense and disinterested affection. Those that enter into this life must be holy;⁴ and the most distinctive characteristic of their association will be mutual love. The love of God, which is the first commandment, and the love of our neighbor, which is not far below it, are to be there perfectly and continually fulfilled in the hearts and practices of men. This life can be no reward for the selfish; but only for the unselfish, the righteous, the holy: the love of its rewards is entirely consistent, is identical, with the love of virtue.

3 Jesus says: “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled [with righteousness].” Matt. V:6.) By righteousness we should understand here the being and the doing what is right. A reward of a like high nature is contemplated, no doubt, in the following injunction and promise; a reward of a lower nature is expressly condemned: “When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren, nor thy kinsmen, nor rich neighbors; lest haply they also bid thee again, and a recompense be made thee. But when thou makest a feast, bid the poor, the maimed, the lame, the blind: and thou shalt be blessed, because they have not wherewith to recompense thee: for thou shalt be recompensed in the resurrection of the just.” (Luke, XIV:12-14.)

4 “And there shall in no wise enter into it anything that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination, or maketh a lie.” (Rev. XXI:27.)

A religion that promises such a life and can fulfill its promise, is immeasurably superior to every religion and moral system that offers nothing of the kind. If to attain high Utilitarian and moral excellence for this life is a great object for every one; then to enter into an endless life of higher degrees and enjoyment of the same excellence, is that much a greater object. If to labor earnestly for the Utilitarian and moral good of our fellow-men is a primary end for the present; then to labor that they may possess this good forever in degrees higher than are possible in this world, and that we may be associated with them in this superior mode of existence, is an end far greater. If the approbation of excellent men living, and the ideal approbation of the excellent dead, is, as the noblest Utilitarians believe, a reward that a truly virtuous man may value; then the ceaseless approbation of the Creator and of all the assembly of righteous men, must be much more so. To live in one's successors, in the effects which one's unselfish devotion to their highest excellence and happiness has produced in them, is indeed a worthy aim of virtuous aspiration. It has been a primary aim of many a noble heart. But to continue after the present life in the possession of individual conscious existence, in a state of closer fellowship with God, and of perfect love and mutual unselfish offices with our fellow-men, is very much worthier. This is the superiority of the religion of the Gospels to the religion of humanity. The religion of the Gospels proposes to secure for the religion of humanity the perfection and perpetuity of the latter's own best things. What is there in this that should give offence, and not pleasure, to any intelligent, healthy and virtuous mind?

Mr. Mill is inclined to believe that future eternal life under favorable conditions, even if it were sure, might not be desirable and satisfy the usual expectations in regard to it; that immortality might become oppressive; that the possessors might after a time begin to feel that

they had had "enough of existence and would gladly lie down and take their eternal rest." "It seems to me," he adds, "not only possible but probable, that in a higher, and, above all, a happier condition of human life, not annihilation but immortality may be the burdensome idea; and that human nature, though pleased with the present, and by no means impatient to quit it, would find comfort and not sadness in the thought that it is not chained through eternity to a conscious existence which it cannot be assured that it will always wish to preserve."⁵ Mr. Mill seems unreasonably to limit the resources of the Creator of the universe, and the springs and joys of action in the human heart. But we need not concern ourselves with his exceedingly morbid speculation on this subject, for we may be sure it never can affect many minds. The love of personal conscious existence, which is so general and so intense, will always of itself decisively refute it for nine hundred and ninety-nine of every thousand of mankind who have ever had experience of the "glorious inheritance of life" under common conditions, and have not resolved upon rebellion against the government of the universe.

⁵ Three Essays on Religion, p. 122.

***THE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIAN WATER-BAPTISM ACCORDING TO THE NEW TESTAMENT.**

BY G. KITTEL.

PART II.

We pass now to the writings of the Apostle Paul. I. Corinthians 1, 14 and 17 is of fundamental importance in the representation of his view of Christian water-baptism. In these verses he certainly does not intend to deny that it has any value. Yet, even if we emphasize ever so much that it was only the peculiar circumstances in the Corinthian church which made it appear to be an advantage to him that he had baptized so few there, still it is scarcely conceivable that, in his joy on that account, he would have used expressions not very favorable to baptism if in his mind a higher value belonged to it. Especially must we maintain that if he had ascribed to baptism the influence of a spiritual blessing, in his great zeal for the salvation of other souls, he would not have allowed the opportunity to escape to baptize as often as possible. He certainly would not have thanked God that he had so seldom helped others to this blessing, even if it could be imparted by anyone as surely as by himself. In this case he would have considered baptism alongside of preaching the gospel as his calling, although Christ had not expressly commanded it and evidently no higher spiritual capacity was needed to perform it. In short, the influence of baptism must stand far behind that of the gospel and in no case can a "power of God unto salvation" belong to it as it does to the gospel (Romans 1.16). If we include verses 12 and 13 in our survey, we learn that by Christian baptism is given a reception into the group of men who are named for Christ. In saying this there is no need of giving up its significance entirely.

In the writings of Paul, too, there are found passages which have been erroneously referred to water-baptism

* *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, Jan., 1914. Translated by W. W. Everts, Roxbury, Mass.

while they really refer to the baptism of the spirit. First of all I. Cor. 12.13 is to be mentioned: "For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body." The word "baptized" is not a contradiction because it was a current expression in the Christian church based on the well known passage in Joel which tells of the pouring out of the spirit, or a baptism of the spirit. As we recall I. Cor. 1, 14, 17, it is impossible for us to think of an impartation of the spirit by means of water-baptism. This should be kept in mind when we consider Titus 3:5. Here instead of the specific expression "baptism" which one must look for, the indefinite word "washing" is used so that the idea of water-baptism is still more remote. On the contrary it is not surprising that the pouring out of the spirit is compared to a bath when we consider verse 6. The spirit has been poured forth abundantly. The image of a fulness of water, as in a bath, occurs to the Apostle's mind.

A third passage is found in Paul, that has nothing to do with Christian water-baptism, even though the traditional text may require such an interpretation.

Eph. 5:25 reads: "Christ also loved the church and gave himself for it that he might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the word." This verse includes a labyrinth of difficulties, from which there is no escape except by correcting the text. As it would lead too far to prove the impossibility of the many explanations that have been given, I will content myself with giving my objections to the traditional text. From the impression which every unprejudiced reader receives, the two lines from "cleanse" to "word" are inseparably connected. In this participial clause, that is joined to "sanctify", is given a more exact account of how the sanctifying which Christ designed for his church is to be or has been carried out. If the "washing of water" designated baptism, then it would follow from this clause that the cleansing of the Christian church is accom-

plished by baptism. But it is a conception foreign to the New Testament to say that the church is not already cleansed by the blood of Christ, but must be in a complete sense only by baptism. Besides baptism elsewhere always appears as an act administered to an individual, never as here to the whole church. Further, it is grammatically impossible to refer "cleansing" to baptism. It is a well-known fact that the aorist "cleanse" can have but two interpretations. The act of "cleansing" must either precede or be simultaneous with the act of "sanctifying." Now it cannot precede for what significance would the surrender of Christ unto death in order to sanctify the church have if the church was already cleansed by baptism? If "cleansing" refers to "baptizing" it cannot be simultaneous with "sanctifying." For if both acts took place in the past we would arrive at the absurd notion that a cleansing of the church by baptism took place when Christ sanctified it by the surrender of Himself upon Golgotha. But if the two acts are relegated to the future, then Christ would have offered Himself with the intention of sanctifying, His church afterwards by cleansing it by baptism. Then new difficulties would arise. We would come to the strange idea that "Christ in His suffering and death had especially in His mind baptism and its significance. In this way, too, in increasing measure, would be expressed the idea that the sanctifying work of Christ for His church was not concluded with His sacrificial death, a notion that is not in accord with other utterances of the Apostle. Besides we could not suppress, here less than elsewhere, our astonishment that baptism appears in a connection, yea is thrust to the front, where husbands are exhorted to love their wives and sacrifice for them as Christ did for the church. So we see that the two possible ways, namely that "cleansing" precedes or is simultaneous with "sanctifying," cannot be followed, if baptism is intended. If this supposition is nevertheless held

to, it must be gained by the use of what is grammatically impossible, namely, that the act of "cleansing" follows the act of "sanctifying," in the future. Of the further difficulties that arise in this case from the expression "by the word" I will say nothing but will maintain that in those words the root of all the trouble is found, a trouble that can be removed by the change of two letters. For "by the word" I read "by the blood." In the conviction that this correction restores the original text I am strengthened by a private letter from the well-known text critic Oscar Von Gebhardt, who says that the Hollander, Venema, in the 17th century, considered that very correction necessary. To be sure it is surprising to speak of a water bath in blood, an expression which is evidently caused by the corruption of the text.

Everything strange disappears when we remember that the marriage custom of the country was in the mind of the Apostle. The husband required a pure wife. Hence it was the custom that the bride to be took a bath before the day of the marriage. Christ required a pure church (verse 27) but because it could not purify itself, he purified it Himself by the bath of blood of His self-sacrifice.

Romans 6.3 is one of the passages that treat of Christian water-baptism and yield important results. For our purpose all will depend on the meaning to be given the words which sound differently but mean the same thing. By baptism we are "baptized into the death of Christ." "We are buried with Him into death;" we have been "planted in the likeness of his death." The meaning of these expressions is found in the phrase: "dead indeed unto sin", (verse 11) for according to verse 10 Christ also "in that he died, he died unto sin once." The further question remains what does it mean for us to be "dead unto sin." May it mean, perhaps, that we have become insensible to its accusations and condemnations, in other words that our sins are forgiven? That is not

possible for it is the presupposition and starting point of the discussion of the meaning of baptism in the beginning of Chapter 6, that grace rules over us, that is to say we are reconciled with God. In this discussion by the Apostle there is no question about the gaining and keeping of grace. The point is that we should not follow the will of sin; for although, according to the conclusion of chapter 5, its rule is broken by the superior power of divine grace, still it is ever seeking to seize control again of individual men. Our claim that the forgiveness of sin is not now under consideration we maintain in spite of verse 7, which says: For he that is dead is freed from sin; for this is simply a common remark which means that you cannot speak of a dead body as sinning. We might understand the words, "dead unto sin," as saying that baptism has destroyed the desire to sin, so that we have no more feeling for it than a corpse has. However, in this case the question raised in the opening of the chapter, "shall we continue in sin," would have as little meaning as the exhortation to those baptized, that runs through the whole section, not to let sin rule over them any longer. Besides it should be observed that whenever the Apostle expresses himself more exactly he speaks not of equality but of likeness to the death of Christ. If Christ after the death that he died unto sin felt no inclination for it, that is by no means true of us. Just so the Apostle says only "reckon yourselves to be dead," that is consider yourselves dead as Christ really is but you are not yet in reality.

Hence, our death unto sin can not be death in fact but only death in principle.

Does not the Apostle at least declare that our sinful lust has been stifled and weakened by baptism? Is not this the course of his thought: "On account of your baptism you are in better shape to suppress sin; so you should do it?" But this supposition also is not valid. For in this passage the question is not whether we have

strength enough to resist sin but according to verse 1 simply whether we have a right to continue in sin in order to give divine grace an opportunity for a more glorious manifestation of itself. Therefore the thought is developed that any one who entertains such a wanton purpose, does not know the great gravity of baptism, and the Apostle would have fallen out of this course of thought, if he had turned aside to speak of the advantages of baptism. Besides he had already said at the close of chapter 5, that we in the age after Christ are in better position to resist sin successfully than the men who lived before Christ, but he traces this superiority not to the effect of baptism but to the reign of grace. He comes back to this thought in verse 14 where he says: "sin shall not have dominion over you: for ye are not under the law, but under grace," but this passage occurs after the discussion of baptism is concluded, with the evident purpose of giving new courage to those who may have been discouraged by his insistence on the stern demands of baptism. As for the next these demands were in harmony with the real purpose of the candidate. It was his firm determination to break completely with his past, whether heathen or Jewish, and to live to God with all his powers joined to Christ. The memory of this disposition of his heart during the act of baptism must have deepened the impression of the Apostolic exhortation not a little. After all this is the Apostle's conception of baptism. In immersion in water he sees a burial; but only the dead are buried, in this case one who has died with Christ unto sin, that is, has thoroughly renounced sin and has determined to lead a new divine life in alliance with Christ. In other words: baptism is to the Apostle a symbolical representation of joining Christianity and it especially expresses the fact that the new member is pledged and is willing to fight against sin in himself inexorably.

A second important passage is Galatians 3:27. This verse is made to support the preceding verse or to speak more correctly, to explain only a single expression in that verse, namely, how the relation designated by "in Christ", came to pass. Consequently verse 26 is not to be translated as it is usually. "Ye are the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus" but "Ye are children of God by faith as far as ye are in Christ Jesus." Otherwise verse 27 would have to read: "For as many as have been baptized have faith in Christ." Moreover in the following verses it is not "faith in Christ Jesus" but the condition designated by "in Christ Jesus" which is the ruling idea, for the expressions "to be in Christ" (v. 28), are actually identical. Now, if verse 26 must be translated in the usual way, then in verse 27 we actually are in Christ by baptism. But it is not to be understood as if by baptism a force working in this direction had been exercised upon the candidate; for in unmistakable terms it is said of those baptized that they have put on Christ themselves, not that he has been put on them. Although therefore the candidate in a passive way receives the ceremony of baptism, he is after all thought of us inwardly actively concerned. What "putting on Christ" means, is clear from the following verse which says: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus." In baptism one lays aside so to speak his nationality, his position, his sex; he wishes to be nothing but a Christian. But in joining to Christ one has not yet the Holy Spirit, he is not yet justified and is not yet a child of God—for all this comes only when faith is present (see v. 14, 24, 26)—at first he has put on Christ only externally as a garment, but he is also an heir of the blessing of Abraham (v. 29), that is, he has the prospect and possibility of winning those good things for himself, but only and always on the path of faith.

It is to be noticed in Colossians 2:12 that the usual division of the verse is incorrect. The clause "buried with him in baptism" belongs to verse 11. Verse 12 should begin with "wherein also ye are risen with him" for it is apparent that these words form a parallel with the preceding clause "in whom also ye are circumcized." To say that burial and resurrection answer to each other or that being circumcized does not rhyme with being buried, does not contradict our contention, because the two last expressions are bound together well by the words "in putting off the body of the flesh." The new verse 11 expresses two things: (1) we have been buried with Christ in baptism. (2) By being buried with Christ in baptism, Christian circumcision, not made with hands, has been performed upon us. As to number 1 we may refer to our remarks on Romans 6:3. As to number 2 the remark should be made; that it will favor the same conclusion as number 1, can be accepted from the start, because the figures used suggest different forms for the same matter. Nevertheless, for the sake of certainty, we must investigate the matter more carefully. Christian circumcision is described as the "putting off the body of the flesh." Therefore, this body is put off in baptism. But what can that mean? The Apostle cannot mean that the guilt of our sins is put off by it, for it is not till the next sentence, that begins with "in whom ye are risen" and that introduces a new thought, is that the forgiveness of sins is mentioned, and designated as the means which faith applies in order to rise to a new life. The "putting off of the body of flesh" cannot be comprehended as the destruction of our flesh with its lusts and desires, because the same persons who are said to have put off the body of flesh, are exhorted in the next chapter to mortify their fleshly members. So nothing remains but to treat the "putting off" not as a complete fact but as a principle and an obligation. It is favorable to this construction that "putting off" is called a circum-

cision, which also signifies the obligation to walk in God's commandments.

Finally I. Corinthians 15:29 is to be considered, a passage upon which the Religio-historical school lays the greatest weight. I have heard myself one of its representatives in a lecture make this passage the starting point and the basis for the statement of Paul's doctrine of baptism.

With such an estimation put upon this passage, the chief law of exegesis that is to advance from clear passages to those more obscure, is repudiated. For here we have to do with the most obscure utterance of the Apostle concerning baptism. In the first place we learn nothing at all about the effect produced by baptism for the dead. In the second place it cannot be surely determined whether the effect aimed at by substitution is to be represented as that which we to-day call magical. In the third place it cannot even be proved that Paul approved this manner of baptism and the views that lay at the bottom of it. To be sure it is claimed that he would have opposed them expressly, if he had not favored them. But it should be borne in mind that in the connection in which he speaks of this practice he had no interest in testing its validity; because he was concerned in gathering proofs for faith in the resurrection of the dead. Whether he was morally justified in suppressing his disapproval need not be examined any further. It suffices for us to establish that the other references of the Apostle to baptism, references which are as clear as could be wished, contradict the view that baptism exerts magical influences. We have therefore a good right to refuse to allow to this obscure passage any influence upon our representation which is concerned simply with the personal views of the great Apostle.

We can say definitely: For Paul, Christian water-baptism, is a sensible representation of one's joining Christianity. It signifies especially that one has com-

pletely broken with his sinful past and will lead a life in which nothing but Christ and His holy will counts. It does not destroy sinful lust, but it imposes the duty to bring about its destruction. It does not impart the spiritual blessings which faith enjoys but it grants a right to them. Among these blessings is the gift of the Holy Spirit.

There are still remaining two passages that are worthy of consideration, namely I. Peter 3:21 and Hebrews, 10:22. Peter says: "Baptism doth also now save us." It saves not by "putting away the filth of the flesh," but as "the answer of a good conscience." Now "answer" evidently means nothing but a question or request. If then Baptism is a request for a good conscience, it evidently does not give a good conscience itself; however certain it may be of being answered. If one prefers to translate the genitive, "of a good conscience" subjectively, that would not give any greater significance to baptism, for the request would proceed from a good conscience which the candidate would bring to the baptism with him. In no case is the meaning of this passage entirely clear. Perhaps the trouble is that the expression is inexact so that we might think of Acts 22:16 where likewise a prayer, a prayer for the forgiveness of sins, that is a prayer for a good conscience, is spoken of in connection with baptism.

As far as Hebrew 10:22 is concerned, it is quite possible that the words, "our bodies washed with pure water," ought to be referred to baptism. On the other hand the parallel words, "our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience," according to the context and compared with 9:14 (the blood of Christ purges your conscience,) evidently refer to the saving effect of the blood of Christ. No certain result can be reached because the figurative expression, "washed", cannot be pressed and arbitrarily filled with a definite content. We should be especially careful in this direction in expounding He-

brews, the author of it loves figures so. However, it is not improbable that baptism is meant to have a symbolical representation as sharing in the purging from sin which is accomplished by the blood of Christ. On the other hand the idea that baptism creates this purging, is to be rejected because the participial sentence, beginning with the word "sprinkled," is against it.

If in conclusion we put and compare together all the results gained from the different passages in the New Testament, we receive the impression that in time baptism gained a deeper significance. I am thinking especially of the description which Paul gives of the baptized in Romans 6, in contrast with the idea we must form of the many disciples of Christ in the Gospels or the Acts. This is explained by the fact that Paul did not have in mind mass baptisms but attributed to others the feelings he had at his own baptism. There can be no question of actual contradictions. It is nowhere claimed that water-baptism imparts the Holy Spirit, or destroys sinful lust, or elicits other changes in the soul. It everywhere stands as an external sign that an inner change has taken place in an individual. By it, one who already in heart belongs to Christ is received into the visible fellowship of those who bear Christ's name and stand under his saving and hallowing influence.

But if, under special circumstances, the receiving of the forgiveness of sins is brought into connection with baptism, the meaning is that it confirms in a symbolical way what really is rooted in repentance and faith. In short it is, in every view, of the case only the sensible expression of the fact that a change of mind toward Christ is present, and it is applied to advance and to complete this change of mind. Hence it is a baptism of repentance like the baptism of John and not essentially different from it.

THE RISE AND SPREAD OF SOCINIANISM.

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Faustus Socinus, the founder of the Socinian party, was born in Italy at Siena. Siena was long a rival of Florence. It had its university famous as a seat of Jurisprudence, which was fed by students from several academies within the city limits. It was the birthplace of Bernardino Ochino and of Giordano Bruno. In the age-long conflicts between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines, it took sides with the Emperor against the Pope. It cultivated the classical literature revived by the Renaissance. Thus there was a three fold tendency in Socinus' native city to break with Rome, a classical, a legal and a political, before a religious reason had appeared. Bruno met his fate at Rome in the year 1600. Ochino fled from Italy. He was twice vicar general of the Capuchins. The Emperor Charles V., after hearing Ochino preach a sermon, declared that he would make the stones weep. In 1542, when 54 years of age, he met Juan Valdez at the home of Peter Martyr in Naples. Valdez had brought Anabaptist tracts into Italy and he did more, Antonio Carraccioli¹ said, in subverting men's minds in Naples than an army of 8,000 Germans camping there. The same year Ochino went to Venice which was the freest city in Italy as the Doge, not the Bishop, inflicted punishment. He began to question whether the doctrine of the Trinity has any practical use and he suggested that it, like the doctrine of the Eucharist, ought to be subjected to a fresh examination. In his dialogues, Neander says,² he presented the arguments against the Trinity with greater point and urgency than those in its favor. Beza said, he would rather doubt of a thing than define it. Being summoned to Rome he started, but stopped to consult

1 C. F. Illgen, *Life of Socinus*, p. 31.

2 A. Dorner, *History of Doctrine*, II, 647.

Peter Martyr at Florence, when both concluded to flee and thus they escaped the armed men who were on the way from Rome to arrest them. In 1547 the two Reformers accepted Cranmer's invitation to settle in England, where they remained in safety and honor until the death of King Edward in 1554. Twenty of his sermons were translated by the mother of Francis Bacon.³ His dialogues were one of the main factors in the preparation of the way for Socinus. Hottinger called them "Diabolisms." He was a skilled analyst of ideas. When he threw off his Capuchin cowl he retained, as a scull cap, his Scotist dialectics. I have tried all the Reformed churches without satisfying my conscience, he said. I hope, by the aid of God, a church will be established uncontaminated by any of those things which have displeased me in the other churches.⁴

Venice remained for several years a gathering place for anabaptist exiles from Switzerland. In that country Ludwig Haetzer had written a book against the Divinity of Christ which Zwingli had succeeded in suppressing. There, soon after, in 1530,, Servetus, the Spanish physician, published a volume in which he violently attacked the doctrine of the Trinity and the practice of infant baptism. In 1533 Melanchthon wrote to Camerarius,⁵ "You know I have always been afraid that question concerning the Trinity would arise. Good God, what tragedies it will excite in posterity." Servetus said; "Christians treat those who differ from them not only with most bitter hatred and contumely, but also with exquisite torture and horrible punishment. This is not done privately, but in the name of the church. This slaughter of the innocents is the eternal disgrace of the church. We thought a benign God had removed this yoke from our necks and that the most pleasant light of liberty was

3 Herzog's, *Real Encyclopedia*, XX, 261.

4 *Theological Review*, 1879, pp. 293, 559.

5 K. Müller, *Ch. History*, II, 505.

shining, when suddenly it looked as if God had repented of his benefits. He had begun to restore liberty. We preferred servitude. For the domination which others had exercised over us, we began to exercise over others, as if we objected not to the servitude of others but to their domination over us." This volume was circulated in Northern Italy, as we learn from Melancthon,⁶ who in 1539 warned his friends there against it. It is in reference to Servetus and perhaps to Valdez also, that the saying in Holland arose: "Spain produced the hen, Italy nursed the eggs and we hear the chicks peeping." In the year 1542 Servetus edited Pagninus' Hebrew Bible, with an inter-linear Latin translation of his own. When he was burned to death at Geneva, in 1553, while in the flames, he prayed for the forgiveness of his sins and for mercy for his enemies.

Among other conspicuous men in this group of precursors of Socinus was Camillo Renato of Sicily, who thought that Adam would have died if he had not sinned, that the wicked will be annihilated, that the elect have an inner guest, and that baptism is merely a symbol. DaPorta says, it was he who traced the outline of the Socinian system.⁷

Curio⁸ was the youngest of a family of 23 children. He became professor at Basel where he entertained Socinus' uncle Laelius. He was ancestor of the families of that city, well known in theological circles, the Buxtorfs, Zwingers, Werenfels, and Freys.

Claude of Savoy scattered anti-trinitarian opinion in Italy in 1534 and produced a commotion if not a sect. It was he who suggested to Socinus to translate John II, "The word was God's."⁹

6 C. G. Neudecker, *Dogmen geschichte*, I, 329.

7 *Theological Review*, 1879, p. 305.

8 Schaff, *Ch. History*, VII, 651.

9 Wallace, *Antitrinitarian Biography*, I, 13, 205; *Sneckind, Magazin*, p. 141.

Castellio, also of Savoy, was first of his age as translator of Latin into French. He lost the favor of Calvin at Geneva by publishing new views of Solomon's Song. He settled with his family in Basel and worked for the printer Oporinus. In his extreme poverty he gathered drift-wood from the River Rhine. In 1551 he published a Latin New Testament which he dedicated to Edward VI, praising Christian love, and tolerance for those of different opinions. Ten editions of this Testament were called for. He also published editions of the classics and the Church Fathers. Finally, in the year 1553, he was appointed Professor of Greek. One of his devoted pupils, John Kiska, lord of 70 cities and 400 villages in Lithuania, erected a splendid monument to him in Basel. He left dialogues which were published at Basel in 1578, under an assumed name, by Socinus and, as Alexander Schweizer¹⁰ has shown, these dialogues contained the main outline of the ideas which Socinus afterwards elaborated. In his book on "Heretics," Castellio said: "I know certain theologians who when in peril cried out against the inquisition of conscience, but now they endorse what they formerly condemned. We should think Christ a Moloch, so many men are being burned alive in his name and to his honor. The coercion of conscience produces hypocrisy and it wounds the conscience too, because whatsoever is not of faith is sin. Satan likes to sow tares in the new broken ground of the Reformation. He has begun to sow the bad seed and under pretense of piety he eradicates heretics. It's a false idea that men may be persecuted for religion. This false idea is the real heresy. The Anabaptists with their communistic notions may be dangerous, but they should be left alone unless they put such ideas into execution. They should not be interfered with as long as they keep within the law."

10 *Theol. Jahrbuch*, 1851, p. 15. Herzog, *ut supra*, III, 53.

Another who influenced Socinus was his uncle Laelius, whom Lecky¹¹ described as "the timid Italian who spent his life in passing from country to country, and from university to university, shrinking with nervous alarm from all opposition and notoriety, and instilling almost furtively into the minds of a few friends whom his gentle manners had captivated the great principles of religious toleration." Neander¹² says: "He wished to establish his Jurisprudence firmly on the principle of divine right as the source of all human equity. The prevalent scepticism of Italy had not left him untouched. His religious faith was sufficiently powerful to form a counter-poise to the consequence of doubt. He never fell into total unbelief, but he became perplexed about the faith he had hitherto held. There was no distinct central point of his own religious life from which to start. His juridical point of view excluded the more intensive Christian." When Laelius died in 1562, Faustus came to Zurich and took possession of his papers.

It was these men, Laelius, Castellio, Claude, Curio, Camillo, Ochino, Valdez, and Servetus, whose writings were the storehouse from which Socinus constructed his system. They were men possessed of all the culture and refinement of the age, but like the twelve men whom the Apostle Paul found at Ephesus, they did not know that there was any Holy Spirit. They knew nothing of the experience of the Reformers over the Alps, condemnation by the law, conviction of sin, justification by faith, and saving grace, without which, as Luther¹³ said, there is no right understanding of Scripture. "They were modest scholars, intelligent laymen, laborious theologians," says one writer.¹⁴ "No," says another,¹⁵ "not

11 Lecky, *Hist. of Rationalism*, I, 372.

12 *History of Doctrine*, 2, 628.

13 W. Walker, *Hist. of Reformation*, p. 492.

14 F. Cheynel, *Rise of Socinianism*, p. 18.

15 K. F. Staüdlin, *Hist. of Rationalism*, 92.

theologians at all, but men of the world, scholarly men who dipped into theology." "Sceptical academicians," Calvin¹⁶ called them. "The aesthetic spirit," says Dorner,¹⁷ covered their consciences as with a luxurious mantle. Their delight was to raise questions, to insinuate doubts, to tolerate indifference as to established truth. They laid a foundation, not as the Reformers did in the Bible, but in classical literature and the skeptical philosophy. The Bible was an after-thought with them.¹⁸ Duns Scotus, the Doctor Subtilis, was their chief authority. He was a Nominalist and an Empiricist. He denied that reason can prove the immortality of the soul or the existence of God. In this he anticipated Kant. He magnified the will, the arbitrary will of God, which may contradict the dictates of reason. It is this arbitrary will of God (nothing necessary in the divine nature) which makes the atonement acceptable. Christ's merit is not sufficient of itself, but was accepted as such for the purpose of redemption by the divine will. A good angel or a perfect man might have served as well. He maintained that it was possible for every man to attain atonement for himself.¹⁹ In this he distinctly anticipated Socinus and the Arminian theologians who used his term "acceptilatio."²⁰

"Faustus Socinus to judge from his portrait," Alexander Gordon says,²¹ "had a short neck, round shoulders, wrinkled forehead, a small, graceful mouth, a thin beard, a pondering look which deaf people often acquire. His expression was grave, sensitive and very self contained. He was cock-sure, confident of his absolute certainty when he knew. There was naked frankness in his doubts, when

16 Schaff, *ut supra*, VII, 629.

17 Dorner, *ut supra*, I, 428.

18 L. T. Spittler, *Geschichte der Kirche*, p. 556.

19 A. Ritschl, *Justification and Atonement*, I, 311.

20 J. H. Scholten, *Religion und Philosophie*, pp. 95-97.

21 *Theological Review*, 1879, p. 564.

he felt that he did not know. He was an engaging correspondent. His voice did not rise high. He made lifelong friends. He was busy without being restless, persecuted but calm. He was not a party man. In controversy he was scrupulously fair and exact, but never sympathetic. He prided himself on avoiding irritating and abusive language. Nothing could be in better breeding than his restraint, and courtly civility. He had no love for those he could not convert." As Shedd says;²² "He had great directness and clearness of speech, but it was comparatively easy for him to be explicit in his statements and transparent in his style, seeing that he reduced Christianity to a few first principles of material ethics." Ritschl says; "Socinus thought that by setting aside the problem of the Trinity he had settled the great Reformation. He was a cultivated scholar, a refined courtier, a successful diplomat, a born leader of men. He filled his followers with the idea that he had discovered the path on which Protestant and Catholic, yes, Jew and Turk, could walk together. To propagate that idea he willingly sacrificed everything that was dear to him. He gathered about him University men, eloquent speakers, keen debaters, convincing writers. They were not afraid of controversy, they rather welcomed it. Not that they were bitter and abusive. In this they differed from their antagonists. Their speech and their writing were persuasive and appealed not to passion or prejudice or interest, but to truth as they understood it. These mainstays of Socinus were from different countries. Schmalz came from Thuringia, Volkel from Saxony, Crell from Franconis, Wollzogen from Austria, Ruarus from Holstein, and Ostorod from Goslar.

Socinianism is the extreme left wing of the theological parliament, the party in opposition. It opposed the creeds of Augsburg and Trent, the Helvetic and the Belgic, and all of the ancient creeds except the Apostles'.

22 W. G. T. Shedd, *Christian Doctrine*, II, 376.

It is a distinct form of anti-trinitarianism. It opposed first of all the doctrine of the Trinity, of three equal persons in the Godhead, of the pre-existence of Christ, of the personality of the Holy Spirit. It opposed the doctrine of pre-destination and of the divine decrees; of the fall of man, of the immortality of the soul and of eternal punishment. It opposed the teaching of expiation, of vicarious atonement for sin, of the whole priestly work of Christ upon earth. It denied the possibility of justification by faith alone, and the need of regeneration. It opposed the baptism of infants and all that went with it. It opposed capital punishment and war and the use of the sword even in self-defense. It opposed the use of oaths and the acceptance of public office where oaths and the sword are used. It opposed the equal authority of the Old Testament with the New.

It was not without positive opinions. The necessity of revelation was affirmed. The authority of the New Testament was maintained. The Virgin birth, the resurrection, the ascension and the enthronement of Jesus were stoutly defended. The Gospel was regarded as a new and better law, and religion was defined as keeping Christ's commandments. The Scriptures were expounded in a new way. Technical, scholastic terms were dropped and a plain and simple language was substituted. The appeal was made to the people in their native tongue, and discussion was no longer confined to the university class room but extended to the market place and the fire-side. It was a comprehensive movement for it claimed to be rational and that it should therefore be acceptable to all. It formed the moderate or latitudinarian party whose aim was to magnify reason and morals above creed. It called for a truce, for toleration, for liberty of thought and of speech, while it attacked the commonly accepted opinions of Christendom. Its method was designed to meet universal prejudice. It published dialogues in which both sides were presented, with the

weight of arguments on the side it represented. It published catechisms in which the prevalent theology was caricatured. In debate its defenders were unsurpassed. They were trained in dialectics. Calmness, moderation, suavity, pertinacity made them generally invincible, especially meeting, as they generally did in debate, inferior wits. In print, they had to face the leading intellects of the age. Not the philosophers, for they were pleased with the appeal to reason. Not the statesmen, for they had long been wearied with the discussions of the school men, but the theologians, almost without exception, paid particular attention to this new theology. The Socinians were a free lance always on the attack. It is easier to attack than to defend. They could raise enough objections in a duodecimo to require a quarto or a folio to answer them. They could make a breach with one volume that would take three volumes to heal.

Socinus maintained ²³ that baptism is an indifferent matter, an open question, and that it should not be treated as if it had been closed. It communicates nothing. It is only a shadow of the forgiveness of sin in the name of Christ.²⁴ When Jesus commanded his apostles to baptize, he had in mind the spiritual baptism of doctrine.²⁵ However, Socinus antagonized the practice of infant baptism. He was no Arian. He did not believe that Jesus lived before his mother. He did not believe that Jesus was the son of Joseph. If He was, he said, both Christ and the Apostles were notorious falsifiers. He insisted on the worship of Jesus and refused to recognize as a Christian anyone who refused such worship. He made the adoration of Jesus the central feature of his system. He said that those who would not adore were as blind to the glory of Christ as were ancient Jews. The only choice that we have is the adoration of Christ or atheism. He

²³ Theological Review, 1879, p. 559.

²⁴ Wallace, *ut supra*, I, 238.

²⁵ W. J. Van Donwen, *Socinian and Mennonites*, p. 27.

admitted that he looked upon Jesus as the Monarchians, Paul of Samosata and Photinus, who thought not that God became man, but that, in the case of Jesus, man became God. Chief among his productions were those entitled, "The Authority of the Scriptures," and "Jesus Christ, the Saviour." He claimed to accept the Apostles' Creed, the creed that confined itself to facts without speculating upon them. He popularized the distinction between essential and non-essential truth. He subordinated the Old Testament to the New, and would not allow any force to Biblical arguments for persecution because they were all drawn from that part of the Bible which is no longer binding upon us. He interpreted the saying of Christ, as to the use of violence, literally as the Friends did afterwards. I can scarcely think, he said,²⁶ that Christian character by any means allows the putting of the guilty to death, or to mutilate their limbs. It is not allowable for a private Christian, even in case of war, to kill or mutilate, even though the supreme magistrate commands him to do it. He consistently condemned the war of freedom²⁷ conducted by the Netherlands against Spain, the war that enabled the United Provinces to shelter his followers when all other countries were closed to them. The only exception that he allowed was that in case of a neighbor who seeks unjustly to take away one's life, then, rather than be killed, one may slightly beat or wound him. Arms may be carried to scare a robber provided they are not used against him.²⁸

Even the New Testament he accepted only so far as it was not repugnant to sound reason, or rather to his practical understanding. He made reason the norm and gave it the veto power over all propositions.²⁹ At Wittenberg, they pretended to despise reason, but Socinus

26 F. Toulmin, *Memoir of F. Socinus*, p. 236.

27 Lecky, *History of Rationalism*, II, 212.

28 *Theological Review*, 1879, p. 564.

29 L. Diestel, *History of Used Old Testament*, p. 391.

would listen to nothing else.³⁰ Paul had declared that the church was the pillar and ground of the truth, but Socinus reversed the order. As Ritschl says: "According to Socinus no one has to learn saving truth from the church, because the true church can itself be known only by the saving truth. So truth must be known first."³¹

In that age all theologians were agreed that heresy was a crime. Strange to say, even Socinus was unable to rid himself of the general opinion on that matter, for he says: "Obstinate heretics should properly be restrained by the magistrate from spreading their errors, and if it cannot be done otherwise by chains and imprisonment. You observe I speak of obstinate heretics." It is a false tribute that Lord Acton pays to Socinus as being the first distinguished writer who, on the ground that church and state ought to be separate, required universal toleration.³² That tribute may be truthfully made to the Anabaptist Balthazar Hubmeyer, who denied the right to prosecute, while, as Lord Acton says: "Descartes advised kings to crush all those who might be able to resist their power, and Hobbes taught that authority is absolute control of religion, and Locke had a notion of always in the right, and Spinoza assigned to the state the liberty which involved nothing more spiritual than the security of property, and was consistent with persecution."

Socinus said that he "strove with the keenest judgment to remove from the church whatever he considered opposed to the glory of God or the comfort of hope or the dignity of religion or the sincerity of piety," but he did not cover up the sharp points of difference which he emphasized. The preface to his catechism says: "The truths necessary to salvation are few and clearly taught,

30 J. A. Moehler, *Symbolick*, p. 609.

31 A. Ritschl, *ut supra*, I, 313.

32 Lord Acton, *History of Liberty*, pp. 48, 94. I. B. Bury, *History of Freedom of Thought*, p. 95.

written as it were with sunbeams. We blame those who place their creed or catechism on an equal footing with the writings of prophets and apostles." In another place he says: "What is considered by Evangelicals and others salutary axioms of religion are demonstrated in this book to be pernicious errors." Pre-destination he caricatures in this way: "Whatever the future may be, by an irrevocable and immutable sentence some are elected and designated for salvation, all others are subjected to eternal damnation, not because of their contumacy, but because so it pleases God. This is the corruption of religion. Why should anyone try if all is necessarily settled beforehand. It is unjust to condemn beforehand, and insincere to invite the lost. It makes God the author of sin." Wollzogen attacked the doctrine of the deity of Christ in this way: "It is more credible that man should be an ass than that God should be a man." Volkel charged that "the doctrine of the Trinity was an invention of the devil."

When in 1619 the Remonstrant or Arminian pastors in Holland were turned out of their pulpits, Guisbert Vander Kodde proposed to hold service without a minister. It was in this emergency that the Collegiants arose with their collegia or conference meetings. Soon there were eighteen such gatherings in different places in Holland. An annual convention was held at Rijnsburg, the town that gave them the name Rijnsburgers. At this place they built a great baptistery, for in their devotion to the Scriptures, they adopted as correct the Socinian mode of baptizing by immersion. This form accounts for a third name which was given to them, the Dompelaars, or Dippers. It was by the hand of a Collegiant, named John Batten, that the first English Immersionist, named Richard Blount, was baptized and from that time this practice has been extended by Baptists over the earth. Unlike the Baptists, but like the Socinians, the Collegiants viewed immersion, not as a church ordinance, but

rather as a private matter. The result was that the ordinance itself, separate from church order and life, fell into disuse and with it the Collegiants themselves gradually disappeared. The Collegiants set down the rule that all differences should be left at the door, all conflicts should be prudently avoided and that edification should be regarded as the chief end of the meeting. The right of private judgment and diversity of opinion must be tolerated among believers as long as the Bible is acknowledged as the only law and Christ the only judge. With their laymen's theology, not careful as to distinctions, not mindful of the theological battles of the past, avoiding scholastic terms and confining themselves to Scriptural phraseology, they attracted to their simple services those who in every land of Christendom at that time, were known as seekers. These souls were weary of the war of words with its bitter personalities; they prayed that all hateful sectarian names might be forgotten, and that there might be a church in which everyone might find a brother and where the Christian name might bind all hearts together. Some of the Collegiants were former Remonstrants, for the time being deprived of an ordained ministry.³³ Some were ex-Mennonites, who, for heresy or for the violation of some sumptuary law, had lost their church connection. Others were Socinians who had nowhere else to go, and, as they seemed to magnify piety and charity, were welcome to these informal gatherings.³⁴ One expressed the growing discontent with the censorious spirit of theologians and the desire to dispense with their services entirely, when he explained why he purposely absented himself from church: "The preachers are too censorious," he said. "They condemn as Arians those whom they have not heard, whose books they have not read. Besides preachers are not necessary for me

³³ Wallace, *ut supra*, 2, 572.

³⁴ H. Alting, *Elenchus*, p. 23.

because I understand these matters better than they do.³⁵ At the end of the Thirty Years War religion ceased to be the all-absorbing topic. Art was flourishing. Its appeals to the imagination called men away from the conflicts of thought. Above all, the vast increase of national commerce, with its growing acquaintance with the ways, the religious ways of the world, led to a pronounced toleration of divergent views. Orthodoxy which had been considered the sheet anchor of national safety was now looked upon as a drag. Wealth always leads to latitudinarianism. So the tendency of the time helped along the Collegiant and Socinian cause. Just then Descartes and Spinoza appeared. The light of reason, rational religion, the rights of man, the love of God and man the only religion, were the watchwords of the followers of Spinoza. He enjoyed the friendship of DeFries, a Collegiant, and he was so hospitably received at Rijnsburg that he went there to live on a street still called Spinoza Street. Such was Spinoza's influence on Mennonites, Remonstrants, Reformed as well as Collegiants that, before the end of the Seventeenth century, each of these divisions was subdivided on his philosophy. It was in 1672 that the Collegiants divided on this issue.³⁶ This was followed in 1680 by another division on the issue of receiving Socinians to the Lord's supper. These divisions weakened the Collegiants so that they never recovered their lost prestige. The old question, how can two walk together except they be agreed still remains unanswered. In this day of church federation and Christian union, the vain effort of the Collegiants to obtain union without doctrinal agreement should be constantly kept before us. They were devout men, but union cannot be maintained by devout hearts who give up the effort of thinking things

³⁵ Wallace, *ut supra*, III, 168.

³⁶ J. S. Vater, *Church History*, III, 334.

³⁷ S. F. Rues, *Present State of the Collegiants*, p. 324. H. Gregorie, *Histoire des Sectes Beligiques*, p. 329.

through. Who is not touched by the account given by Monsieur Stoupe,³⁸ a Protestant officer of the French Army, an eye witness in 1673 of the secret meetings of the Socinians? "They are fervent in prayer to God, with groans and tears. Their conduct is holy and without reproach as far as men can judge by what they see. They say that they have no interest in maintaining their doctrine except the persuasion that they have of its truth. They say that they are confirmed in their faith by reading the word of God and the books that have been written against them." But groans and tears and self confidence are not criteria of truth, neither are they a good foundation for a permanent work. A hostile critic³⁹ described the theological hodgepodge of the Collegiants as "a Mennonite herring, broiled on a Socinian roaster, over coals of hellfire supplied by the Collegiants." Such descriptions are ruled out of court today, even though combinations just as fantastic are still offered to the public, who are determined upon a policy of peace at any cost, and union however incongruous and impossible. Mossheim found the Collegiants still a considerable body in his day, consisting of persons of all ranks and orders, of different sects, with different views of Christ, without authority of rulers or doctors, without restraint of ecclesiastical law, without limitation of creed, without the conservative influence of rite or institution." S. F. Rues⁴⁰ in 1743 found that "a few of the Collegiants were Orthodox, others were Socinians, others Arians. Everything unorthodox was labeled Socinian. Many were Socinians only so far as to reject church creeds. The young men, like most of the Arminians, subordinate Christ to God. They are half brothers to the Arminians and Mennonites though generally reckoned Socinians. The Socinians today are mostly old men. Sixty years ago this

38 J. P. Stoupe, *La Religion des Hollandais*, 1673.

39 J. C. Cobus, *Biographical Dictionary*, II, 757.

40 S. F. Rues, *ut supra*, p. 302.

error attracted much attention, but errors have their day." Samuel Crell,⁴¹ the last Socinian of distinction, attended the Collegiant meeting in Amsterdam when there was but one other present, and that was his sister. She proposed that they worship hereafter at home, but he replied: no, there will be a revival of interest, and sure enough the attendance increased to seventy, but this was only a flicker of the candle before the light went out.

"Socinian tendencies," MacGiffert says,⁴² "passed from Holland to England to find there a development which, in course of time, made English thought dominant throughout northern Europe." The Socinian catechism in Latin was dedicated to King James I, but by act of Parliament in 1614 it was committed to the flames. An English translation of the little volume published in Holland in 1652 was likewise committed to the flames by act of Parliament the same year. The Mennonites, who were confounded with the Socinians, swarmed to the eastern countries and as far as Bath and Bristol. The new ideas fell into congenial soil, in to the heart of Hales, Falkland, Chillingworth and Andrew Marvel, who said, "No man can tell you truth but he must presently be a Socinian." The Parliament of 1654⁴³ asked Cromwell, what he meant by the words Freedom of Conscience. "You may veto bills touching freedom of conscience but not those for the suppression of heresy." When the Parliament of 1655⁴⁴ passed a bill to punish a Socinian, Cromwell dissolved it, with a reproof for its persecuting spirit and released the Socinian. He said to the Parliament next year:⁴⁵ "I will not allow any one sect to tyrannize over another." John Owen⁴⁶ was selected by Parliament to answer the Socinian argument. "I had rather lament than

⁴⁵ Edw. Young, *Life of Tillotson*, p. 27. Wallace, *ut supra*, II, 319.

⁴¹ Wallace, *ut supra*, IV, 477.

⁴² A. McGiffert, *Protestant Thought before Kant*, p. 187.

⁴³ Wallace, I, 169.

⁴⁴ John Owen, *Works*, XII, 42.

⁴⁶ Wallace, I, 334.

relate the progress Socinianism is making in our native country. Unless the Lord lay his awe on the hearts of men, I cannot but fear that this soul destroying abomination shall break in as a flood upon us. There is not a city, town, scarce a village in England, where some of their poison is not poured forth. They do nothing but cavil and take exceptions. They don't care what becomes of religion if they can only answer an argument put against them. They say that is not the sense of the Scripture though they can assign no other." Archbishop Tillotson⁴⁷ admitted that "the Socinians were the strongest managers of a weak cause that ever meddled with controversy, insomuch that the Protestants and even the Jesuits themselves, who pretend to all the reason and subtlety in the world, are, in comparison with them, but mere scolds and bunglers. Upon the whole matter they have but one defect, that they want a good cause and truth on their side, which if they had, they have reason and wit and temper enough to defend it."

"Later in the seventeenth century, two of the most distinguished Englishmen, Milton⁴⁸ and Locke⁴⁹ accepted the Socinian contention against the Trinity. Perhaps to avoid unpleasant scandal, the poet marked his work on "Christian Doctrine" posthumous. It was accidentally discovered in the year 1823 and given to the world. The philosopher was less timid and he analyzed Bishop Stillingfleet's metaphysics concerning the Trinity so sharply that, as Dr. Bentley, the Bishop's chaplain confided to William Whiston,⁵⁰ it hastened the Bishop's death. Locke tried in vain to induce William III to include the Socinians in the Act of Toleration. In 1693 John Edwards published his "Preservation against Socinianism." "Now our nation is like to be filled with these books and I did ever fear it, and now that which I feared is come to pass. To extenuate an error is to weaken the truth

47 A. Seeberg, *History of Doctrine*, II, 270.

48 *Life of Wm. Whiston*, II, 294.

49 G. J. Planck, *Modern Church History*, p. 410.

50 A. Dorner, *Dogmen Geschichte*, I, 398.

MEN AND BOOKS.

BY W. W. EVERTS, ROXBURY, MASS.

When a writer asserts too much, he arouses the suspicion that he is not quite sure after all. For instance in the January number of the *American Journal of Semitic Languages* Prof. Breasted repeatedly refers to the Pharaoh Amenophis IV. as the great monotheist. Turning to page 201 of the *Archiv für Relig. Wissenschaft* for the same month we read: "Henotheism is found among the religious systems of Egypt but monotheism, even the reform of Amenophis IV. does not know." Where will men turn now to find an ancient people outside the Bible who were monotheists?

There is a well defined school to-day, called the Religio-historical school, whose one purpose is to trace New Testament ideas to some extra-biblical source. Greek literature has been searched through and through for suggestions of the thoughts expressed by the Apostles. But Norden, a chief authority in the Classics, says: "Whenever we have thought there was direct borrowing of a leading idea of Christianity from the classics we have been in error."

Naegli, another authority, declares: "That any classical poet, philosopher or orator influenced the vocabulary of Paul we may utterly deny. But with the Greek Old Testament it was very different. He lives there but he never makes a citation from an apocryphal book."

Alexander Schweizer neatly answers those scholars who would relegate the gospel of John to the second century. There is a double difficulty, he says, in putting the gospel of John in the second century. (1) A person who could write such an imposing work is looked for in vain. (2) A person who could have written such a book could not have remained unknown.

Schürer says that Luke did not use Josephus. If he had quoted from that prolific author, there could have been no answer to those who claim a late date for the third gospel.

It is said that the collection box drives people away from church. Zeno, the founder of the Stoics, used the penny collection on purpose to drive off curious people who were not capable of following his discourses. Scholars are busy to-day in trying to find the sources of the gospels. They are busy about nothing for, as Julius Kaftan says: "Of course the New Testament is woven of many strands but in the last analysis the strands do not interest us. It is the new, the unique, not the material but the spiritual that engages our attention. Suppose that we find the sources, how does that help us to understand Paul who laid his moulding hand on humanity?"

John Weiss criticizes Wellhausen for the many springs, accidents and impulses manifest in his comments on the gospel of John. He fails to carry conviction because of lack of connection. More than keenness is needed in a commentator, he says; taste and feeling and certainly a little bit of love for the author. Don't interrupt him. Hear him through. Be patient with his peculiarities. The immortal form of this sharply drawn type of devotion will yet rise out of the dust of the reflections cast upon it.

The attitude of intelligent Jews as to the trial of Jesus may be seen from the words of Th. Reinach in the *Revue des Etudes Jaives* for October, 1913. He says: "The Sanhedrin in this process played the role not of Judge but of accuser. The psychological motive of the accusation was of a religious kind, blasphemy, the pretense of being the Messiah, etc."

Heinrici in *Paul's Problems*, 1914, claims that the words charisma and apocalypse (with the meaning revelation), bear the stamp of the Apostle Paul. He

says that the Apostolic Fathers and the apologists of the second century refer comparatively seldom and in some cases not at all to the person and teachings of Paul. What wonder is it that the great apostasy set in so early when Christian leaders turned from Paul to Plato? He says that all of Paul's letters were written in the last years of his life, after he had reached Europe. All but the letters from prison, were written in the sixth decade of the first century.

The archives of Muraschu and Sons, a great firm, were found in 1903 near the river Chebar (Ezekiel 1.3) where the exiles were located. The names are Jewish and may be of descendants of Jews who would not return to Jerusalem.

Ptolemy, who lived 150 A.D., preserved a list of the kings of Babylon from 747 B.C. There is a list of kings of Assyria from 893 B.C. Sargon, king of Assyria, conquered Babylon so that his name occurs in both lists. In 709 B.C. he entered the thirteenth year as king of Assyria and his first year as king of Babylon. This date is absolutely fixed because both lists refer to eclipses of the sun which are confirmed by modern astronomers.

The oldest alphabetical inscriptions have been found in Palestine. Whether called Phoenician, Old Aramaic, Moabite or Hebrew, they all use the same script.

Heinrici, in his "Theological Encyclopaedia," maintains that theology is a science and therefore it cannot produce piety. The Lord, he says, did not send the Rich Young Man to the Scribes. But the question arises whether theology that does not produce piety, has any value.

Auberlen says that an unwarrantable distinction is drawn between the Scripture itself and "the word of God" by those who do not carefully study the Bible. The qualifications of an interpreter are, he says, impartiality, thoroughness, conscientiousness in discovering

the sense of the words and the connection, along with sympathy and interest in the sacred subject of his study. If we build on this one foundation we will come to unity of knowledge.

Harnack speaks of the "raving technique" of some of the New Testament critics. He is a historian and he is tired of schemes that wrench facts instead of bowing to them.

Adolph Schlatter says that there is no record of a miracle in the first century except those mentioned in the New Testament. The *Theol. Literatur Zeitung* for April 25th, expresses its agreement with Schlatter. Exhibitions of power such as are related of Jesus, it says, we look for in vain in Jewish tradition. There can be no parallel because the personality in the gospels, who controls situations, cannot be placed in the same line with devout teachers of the law.

In the January *Archiv. f. Rel. Wissenschaft*, John Weiss replies to the taunt of the philologist Wendland that theologians are afraid to speak of books in the New Testament as pseudonyms. He says: "A philologist, on the broadest basis, should make clear to us the history and essence of pseudonym writings, as well as the consciousness of such writers; how far they appear to be naive or deceitful; how far artists using a conventional form that can deceive no one; did the contemporaries of the author know that he was the author? Such questions can be answered only from the highest eminence. As long as we do not see any clearer in such matters, we will feel a certain disinclination to admit that a book in the New Testament is falsified."

Frederick Blass, the great textual critic, condemned Higher Criticism as pseudo-criticism. The infinite pains taken by the textual critic avoiding conjecture, in settling each letter in the words of the text, he contrasted with the Higher Critic in his excision of verses, chapters, yes whole books from Holy Writ.

Harnack, Troeltsch and Bousset represent three radical schools of thought. Harnack allows that we will never get beyond Jesus. Troeltsch is not sure of that and looks for another and better leader. Bousset sets aside whatever remnants of the supernatural Harnack and Troeltsch still cling to. What does he propose as a substitute for historical Christianity? Nothing but our enlightened thoughts. Troeltsch begs historians to put an end to the tormenting uncertainty in regard to Jesus. Bousset answers: This demand cannot be fulfilled by historians. Systematic theologians, he says, must help the historian beyond himself to a safe place beyond the reach of storms.

The wide gulf that separates Romanism from Protestantism is plainly shown by the following sentence written by their protagonist, Moehler: "I think that if I were in the presence of a man who should declare that he was absolutely sure of his salvation, I would feel uncanny in the highest measure and would probably not know how to avoid the thought that there was something diabolical in his statement." Schleiermacher made the neatest distinction between the two. The Romanist, he said, makes one's relation to Christ depend on one's relation to the Church. The Protestant makes the relation to the church depend on the relation to Christ.

So many to-day are treating the fall of Adam as a myth, it is well to read the words of Brooke Foss Westcott on the matter. "As to the fall, I certainly think that that selfish isolation and consequent declension of man from the normal development which is represented by the fall brought with it the present conditions of death."

"The more I learn the more I am convinced that fresh doubts come from my own ignorance and that at present I find the presumption in favor of the absolute truth of Holy Scripture overwhelming."—Brooke Foss Westcott.

Textual critics arrange manuscripts that have the same additions, subtractions and gaps in the same "group." In this way Von Soden divides the uncials and cursives of the New Testament into three "families" which originated at Alexandria, Caesarea and Antioch.

Josephus (*Archaeology* XI. 8:5) says that when Alexander came to Jerusalem he was shown the prophecy in "Daniel" that the Greeks would conquer the Persians. But the commentaries say that the book of Daniel was written 150 years after the death of Alexander. They charge Josephus with falsehood and deny that Alexander was ever in Jerusalem. Pling (*Hist. Nat.* XII. 26) says that he was Hecateus, who accompanied the conqueror, confirms the Jewish historian. But what do "Higher Critics" care for facts of history?

J. T. Black says: "All forms of doctrine and all systematic theologies are perishable and only half true; the word of Scripture is the unchangeably firm foundation."

Some good souls, who are troubled to reconcile the two gospels and determine whether there were two blind men healed at Jericho or not, may be interested to learn of a modern parallel to that story. Schleiermacher and Steffens went on an excursion together taking two students with them, so Schleiermacher says, though Steffens, in his account, mentions but one.

The Bible teaches that man was made in the image of God, but the Religio-Historical school claims that God was made in the image of man.

Many books have been written on "The consciousness of Jesus." The New Testament says nothing of Jesus' consciousness.

What Herodotus said of the position of the sun in South Africa was regarded as a myth until the Portuguese sailed around the Cape of Good Hope and found the statement true.

What Genesis XIV. says of Amraphel was treated as a myth until that name appeared on an Assyrian cylin-

der. No law of the development of pagan religions has yet been found. When that is found it will be time to try to work the Christian religion into the scheme.

The modern Marcionites cut off the post as well as the preëxistence of the Lord Jesus.

Many preachers to-day object to the use in the Christian pulpit of terms taken from the Jewish liturgy. They prefer to use abstract terms taken from heathen philosophers.

Martin Kachler was in an agony of doubt when he was a student. "I understand Kaut. I understand Spinoza," he cried, "but I can't understand Paul." His trouble was that he did not know the Lord Jesus. You can understand the philosophers, but you can't understand the Apostle, without that knowledge.

Humanism was the renaissance of pagan culture which was based on an aristocracy resting on slavery.

Many people, without knowing it, accept an inveterate delusion *as a demonstrated truth*. Two of the most important books of the New Testament, Ephesians and Galatians, owe their origin to false doctrines, that they were written to combat them.

To strengthen his doctrine of election Calvin did violence to passages that tell of universal grace. In defense of his doctrine of Justification, Luther discarded the book of James as "an epistle of straw." But Calvin was mild compared with the Synod of Dort, and Luther compared with Hollaz and Calovius. Deism and Rationalism were natural reactions against the effort to magnify a part as though it were the whole of truth.

The site of Golgotha has been sought all around Jerusalem, but Dalman ventures to say: 1600 years ago the site was determined and they must have been very sure that they were right because, contrary to all appearances, they located it in the centre of the old city where the

church of the Holy Sepulchre now stands. When a Christian traveller came to Jerusalem, he asked where Golgotha was and it was pointed out to him.

In the reign of Claudius a freedman, a physician named Tyrannos, received special honor on the Emperor's day. A little later John referred to a vision he enjoyed on the Lord's day.

Abraham had an altar at Bethel. Jacob dreamed of angels ascending to heaven at a place between Bethel and Ai, on the road to the Jordan which he took in flight from Esau. Joshua captured Ai by placing an ambush in the woods of Bethaven, woods from which in the days of Elisha 42 she bears came to destroy the youthful mockers of the prophet.

Merib-Baal is mentioned in I. Chronicles 8:34, as a son of Jonathan. The same name has been found inscribed on a piece of crockery dug out of the ruins of ancient Samaria. In the same excavation the diggers brought up the name Jojada, which reappears in Nehemiah 3:6, revised version.

Egypt lay adjoining Palestine. The Egyptians made their kings gods. The Israelites never did that to their kings. Eduard Meyer explains this fact by saying: "There is no greater contrast than that between the pantheistic Egyptian diety appearing under many names and forms, and the strictly personal God of Israel."

Gunkel says: "The spirit of the religion of Israel is opposed to mythology. The hymns to Jehovah in the Psalms are very different in religious sentiment from the laudations of the gods of Egypt."

The Stoics came nearer than any other school of philosophers to the Bible standpoint in moral questions. Zeno, the founder of this school, was not a Greek. He came from Cyprus and is called a Phenician. It would be interesting if Philo's statement, that Zeno borrowed from Moses, should be proved true, for that would explain the superiority of his system of morals.

An Aramaic inscription has been found which was carved more than 900 years B.C., yet it is still the fashion to use Aramaisms in books of the Bible as evidence not of an early but of a very late date.

To show how uncertain the earliest dates of history are, it is noteworthy that Eduard Meyer reduces the date of Naram Sin from the old figure, 3800 B.C. to 2450.

Usher's chronology, as found in ordinary Bibles, has been too hastily cast aside as antiquated. For instance Usher puts Abraham's battle with the four kings in 1913 B.C. Anchinclos in his "Chronology of the Bible," fixes the date at 1907, and Beecher, in his, "Dated Events," at 1936.

Two hundred workmen have been excavating the ruins of Babylon for the past thirteen years, bringing to light the fortifications, temples and palaces of the ancient city. 30,000 objects of art or letters have been found in the debris there, to 25,000 recovered at Susa and 20,000 at Nineveh.

Carlyle and Ruskin, Dollinger said, were prophets who had nothing to foretell.

Titus, who captured Jerusalem, was the son of a Jewess, and employed Josephus as one of his aides.

The outward vision at Dumascus preceded Paul's inward vision and made it possible.

James Hope Moulton is the author of a grammar of New Testament Greek. His aged mother compiled the copious indexes for him.

The Bible is the record of God's striving with man up to the victory of Christ and effective operation of the Holy Spirit.

About 1700 pietism came as a reaction against dead orthodoxy. About 1800 the evangelical revival came as a reaction against cold rationalism.

The third largest collection of Hebrew literature in the world is found in the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York City.

Luther was very particular to stick to the very letter of "this is my body" in the communion service. What might have happened if he insisted on literal adherence to Christ's words concerning baptism.

When the pastoral epistles were written the age of miracles was drawing to a close. They make no mention among other qualifications of a deacon or bishop that he should be able to perform miracles. Miracles were a sign of an apostle, not of a bishop.

Die Christliche Welt says that there are 202,000,000 Protestants on earth to 290,000,000 Romanists. One hundred years ago the leading nations were Romanists, but to-day Protestants have forged to the front in wealth, in education, in political power and in missionary activity.

Luther prized the words more than the works of Christ and he blamed Luke for abbreviating the sermon on the mount while giving in detail the account of the draught of fishes. He said: "Signs and wonders are apples and nuts to attract children and make them listen and learn."

Some critics are hard to suit. In one breath they charge the Apostle Paul with being rabbinical, a slave to the letter, and with being too liberal in the way he quotes from the Old Testament. As a matter of fact, he sought the unity of the spirit and the letter so that the letter must be understood through the spirit.

Divine revelation is the history of history. It is the power which makes and moves the history of the world. It is the element of progress, leading the development of the world to higher stages. The Old Testament and the

New are not one without distinction, nor are they separate without connection. The Old Testament is the oldest historical record of the great manifestation of the rule of God's Spirit in the human race.

Brooke Foss Westcott wrote to a Sunday School teacher: Read the chapter very carefully. Be sure that every sentence presents to your mind a distinct meaning, and such that you can represent clearly in other terms. The task is difficult and irksome but one of incalculable benefit. Because you will thus be able, not only to form distinct views yourself but to teach them to others, which is one of our highest privileges.

Mark is "the original gospel," they are saying to-day. Anything found in Matthew or Luke, but not in Mark, is not a part of the original gospel. As Mark is the shortest gospel, there is more room for conjecture and speculation.

There is a preference manifested to-day for the simple name Jesus without any attachments. Jesus counts less than Lord or Christ, the names which Paul almost always adds to, the name which is above every name. We understand a man when he says Lord Jesus. We are not at all certain what he means when he says merely Jesus.

Bornhausen in a recent volume declares that the mediating school of Schleiermacher is forgotten to-day in Germany. Sabatier and Ménégoz are trying to revive it in France, and Cross in this country.

De Wette says in his Preface to his commentary on the book of Revelation, which appeared in the year of the Revolution in 1848: "I began the labor during the preparation for civil war in Switzerland, continued it undisturbed as the throne of France fell and the thrones of Germany tottered, and I finished it when anarchy was spreading further and further, and thick black clouds were rising over the peoples and kingdoms. I thank

God for the compassure that he gave me but the thought of the fate impending over us and the church accompanied almost every stroke of my pen. I could not help seeing in our day the anti-Christ described by John, only in a changed form and in darker features, in the egoism of our day which denies God and breaks every band asunder." These words of De Wette recall the fact that Spurgeon wrote his commentary on the imprecatory Psalms when all England was filled with indignation at the Bulgarian atrocities inflicted by the Bashi-Bazooks.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BELIEF.

C. S. GARDNER.

Attention should first be called to the fact that anything presented to a mind is accepted as real without hesitation or questioning unless there is something in the experience or the organization of that mind which opposes it. There seems, however, to be one limiting condition. In order to make it clear what that is let us use one of Prof. James' illustrations. "Suppose," he says, "a new-born mind, entirely blank and waiting for experience to begin. Suppose that it begins in the form of a visual impression of a lighted candle against a dark background and nothing else so that whilst this image lasts it constitutes the entire universe known to the mind in question. Suppose, moreover, that the candle is only imaginary and that no 'original' of it is recognized by us Psychologists outside. * * * Will this hallucinatory candle be believed in, will it have a real existence for the mind?"*

He answers this question in the affirmative. But in this he is, it seems to me, manifestly mistaken. In the first place it involves an error to speak of the candle in such a case as "known." Knowledge involves consciousness of relation, and this implies the presence of two or more images in consciousness. The perception of any relations, any analysis of this total impression into its constituent elements, is not possible before there has been present to consciousness more than one presentation. Indeed, if we can legitimately speak of "consciousness" at all in such a hypothetical situation, we can only mean a primordial and undifferentiated psychical state which really precedes consciousness in any clearly defined sense of the word. Knowledge, in any accurate meaning of the term, is inapplicable here and so is belief.

* *Principles of Psychology.* Vol. II. p. 287.

The child would neither accept nor reject the presentation—it would be neither real nor unreal. To speak of the child's accepting it as real or rejecting it as unreal is to attribute to the child our own mental attitudes. To say that because the child does not reject the candle-impression as unreal it accepts it as real, is to assume that the logical category of contradiction applies to that primordial mental experience, that the child is conscious of the relation of images to one another, whereas by hypothesis this is the single and sole image that has entered into its experience. For the mental act or attitude of belief to occur it is necessary that there should have been more than one experience, more than one image, more than a simple and undifferentiated content of consciousness; and that a beginning at least should have been made in the organization or correlation of those contents—a process which goes on very rapidly in the life of the child.

Whenever, then, the mind's reaction to a stimulus is sufficiently definite to be called belief or unbelief it is conditioned by the present mental content and organization. "Possession is nine points of the law" is a saw which has as much validity in the psychological as in the economic realm. The mind reacts as a whole upon a new presentation. In more abstract phrase we may say that the appropriation of new mental material *is a function of the mind as organized in past experience*. After the new material has been incorporated into the mental system it then plays its part also in determining the mental attitude toward subsequent presentations.

There are as many as six distinguishable ways in which the mind may react to new presentations.

I. First it may feel itself compelled to accept the new presentation as real or true. It is helpless before the presentation; cannot resist it. There may be no perceived opposition between the presentation and the mental organization and consequently no impulse to reject it

and no hesitation in accepting it, and in such a situation, as we shall later more fully point out, the mind cannot reject what is presented to it. But it is not this negative inability of which I now speak. The characteristic note of the reaction now under consideration is that the presentation has a positive compelling character; it *must be received*; it not only bears credentials which entitle it to enter but it comes too strongly armed to be denied entrance. It may be in large measure inconsistent with the mental organization in both its affective and ideational elements, but so much the worse for the mental organization. The presentation in this case necessitates a reorganization, and that means, of course, that it is disagreeable and would be rejected if that were practicable. There may arise an impulse to reject it, but the sense of necessity overwhelms such an impulse at its very birth; the presentation asserts itself and enters, whether or no. In such situations the mind is dealing either with presentations of the sensory type, which come with the clear and emphatic testimony of the senses; or with those which bear the stamp of logical necessity, such as mathematical axioms and the demonstrations based upon them, or the principles of identity, contradiction, etc. We shall not enter here into the question raised in philosophy, whether or not these axiomatic principles themselves have in the last analysis an empirical origin. If their origin should be accounted for in that way, it seems evident that at any rate they do not originate in the experience of the present-day individual, though they doubtless are developed, brought into consciousness, through individual experience. Certain it is that when the mind is confronted by the clear testimony of the senses or by an axiom, it feels the necessity of accepting such a presentation as real, provided it occurs in harmony with the conditions under which our senses normally give us information or under which our minds normally act. The only hesitation or questioning which we feel to be

permissible is as to whether the conditions of perception are normal. If we are convinced that they are normal it puts an end to hesitation.

Now, should this mental reaction be called belief? I think so. If I ask *why* I thus unhesitatingly accept the testimony of my senses or the truth of the mathematical axiom, the only answer that can be given is that I believe my senses give a correct report of reality or that I believe my mind is so constituted as to know truth. The fact that this belief is developed into full consciousness in philosophical meditation after the experience and is not a part of the conscious experience at the moment of perception makes no essential difference. It was implicit in the act. I accept and must accept the testimony of my senses or the truth of the axiom when such a presentation is made under normal conditions; but this necessity does not change its character as belief.

2. The mind may passively admit the presentation. In this case the new presentation, being not of the sensory or axiomatic order, does not call forth the sense of necessity. It does not in any positive or significant way agree with the already existing mental content or organization. It simply does not consciously conflict with any thing in the mental system. It is merely negative with respect to the present mental content. So far as what is already in consciousness is concerned there is no reason for accepting, and no reason for rejecting it. It is then passively admitted, taken for true. It finds ample room in the world of belief as constituted. The best examples of this kind of belief are found in children, though it is by no means limited to children. The child is told, for instance, the story of Santa Claus. Its limited experience contains nothing that is inconsistent with the story; it, therefore, accepts, believes it. At first this experience may seem to be identical in principle with that described in James' illustration; but this is a mistake. In the acceptance of Santa Claus as real, the child is acting with

an already organized consciousness, whereas in the very first presentation to the new-born babe there is no previous experience, no organized consciousness, no criteria of reality, no basis for the formation of a judgment as to the reality or unreality of any thing. When it believes in the existence of Santa Claus, the presentation bears some relation to the existing content of consciousness, a relation which may be described as negative agreement, and any presentation which bears this relation to its experience is accepted as true. But in James' illustration there is no relation of any kind whatsoever with any other content of the mind for the reason that there is no other content, and therefore no mental attitude of belief such as is here described. This type of belief may well be denominated primitive credulity. Many of the contents of the child's mental world are of this character. Indeed, to the end of its life, though it may grow to be a great philosopher with an extensive and critically constructed mental system, many of its beliefs will continue to be of this order, accepted simply because it is of the nature of the mind to accept what is presented to it, if there is no conscious conflict with the mental life as organized in experience. But the building up of an elaborate and reflective correlation of experience establishes a habit of critical examination, which takes the form of intellectual caution and which is applied, often with no conscious intention, to new presentations, especially in the sphere of one's principal activity and usually in matters of incidental interest; so that, as a general rule, with broadening experience credulity becomes a diminishing factor in determining beliefs. But it is an extremely important factor in the lives of children, of ignorant persons and of persons of limited experience.

3. The mind may positively receive the new presentation, may welcome it with more or less cordiality. As in the second case it is not of the sensory or axiomatic type. It does not come bearing credentials of inherent and irre-

sistible validity, like the clear testimony of the senses or the logical axiom. But though it is not in itself irresistible, it is at once felt to be in positive agreement with the existing mental content. It fits into the system. With more or less definiteness it is perceived to dove-tail into the mental structure so as to fill out in some measure the "noetic pattern," to use a phrase of Marshall's. It is an element which carries a step toward fulfillment the incomplete mental organization. When this peculiar experience is of a pronounced type, the presentation is felt to be not only a supplement to but a confirmation of the system of ideas, not only fitting in harmoniously with it but bringing to it an increment of stability; and is accompanied, therefore, by a distinctly pleasant feeling-tone. So to speak, the mind stretches out to it glad hands of welcome and ushers it into a room which seems prepared for it beforehand.

For inducing an act of belief like this it is, of course, only necessary that the new presentation should be in harmony with the content of consciousness at the time. There may be other elements of experience not at the time in consciousness with which the agreement would not be so entire; and later, when the effort is made to bring these elements into conscious relation with the new fact or idea, trouble may begin, a quarrel may arise between these elements and the new-comer so cordially welcomed at first. Again, there may be potential or implicit disharmony between the new presentation and the elements of the mental system that were in consciousness when it was accepted, and this disharmony may subsequently develop. The very host that welcomed the new inmate may discover on further acquaintance that there were deep-seated incompatibilities which were not apparent at the time. These may appear in subsequent reflection, as the mental system undergoes progressive reorganization, and thus an unexpected conflict may be precipitated. This, of course, is more likely to occur in

active and progressive, than static mental conditions. But whatever the subsequent fate of the new fact or idea may be it is believed, accepted as real or true, if it seems to be in harmony with the conscious mental system at the time of perception; and this acceptance is emphatic, *i. e.*, the belief is positive, in proportion as it is felt to confirm that system. If in the course of later reflection and mental reorganization that first "feeling" is justified, the positiveness of the belief will be increased. It will become deeply rooted in our mental world.

4. The mind may receive the presentation with more or less suspicion, as tentatively real or true. This species of reaction is determined by the fact that, while the new presentation seems to be in agreement with the mental system, there accompanies its acceptance a vague sense of uncertainty as to the reality or completeness of the agreement. This vague uncertainty may be due to a general attitude of caution induced by experience; or to the fact that the disagreeing factors are in the background, or perhaps below the threshold, of consciousness, and are indirectly projecting their influence into the conscious field. Every one has had experience colored in this way. For instance, a politician assures us of his devotion to the public welfare, but, while there is nothing known to us in his character or career to excite distrust and we therefore accept his assurance, we have been so often disappointed in men of this class that an almost inevitable shade of distrust goes with our acceptance. Or sometimes when a statement is made to us on good authority our minds are shadowed by a dim doubt of its correctness, the reason for which we cannot explicitly state. We believe the statement—it seems to be in agreement with our experience—and wonder that our belief of it is not more hearty. There is a semi-conscious impulse to question, but not of sufficient strength to cause a suspension of judgment. There is a merely nascent sense of the possibility of discord with parts of our ex-

perience which are not now in consciousness. Closely akin to this attitude, most probably identical with it in principle, is our acceptance of an hypothesis which seems to embody an illuminating principle, but which carries with it the possibility of failure in some as yet untried application. We believe it; but for a time, possibly forever, there accompanies it a shadow of uncertainty which is insignificant as compared with its convincing power, but which nevertheless enters into our mental attitude. With broadening experience that uncertainty may finally disappear and thus the mental attitude gradually change from a tentative to an unqualified belief.

5. The mind may keep the presentation standing at the door, awaiting investigation. This type of reaction is of great importance. It is the attitude of suspended judgment; it is a state of arrested belief. The presentation which is a candidate for incorporation in our mental system is held up for examination. This may be due, first, to its strangeness. The sense of possible conflict with our organized experience may be so pronounced that we cannot admit the new presentation as true until that question is at least tentatively settled. It is a situation similar to that described in the last paragraph; but with this important difference—the sense of uncertainty is relatively much greater, and the quantitative difference in the sense of uncertainty is so great as to result in a mental reaction qualitatively different. This may occur even in connection with the action of one of our senses. If the fact to which one sense testifies is an exceedingly strange one, we do not always accept it as a fact at once. We suspend judgment until we have assured ourselves that the sense is acting under normal conditions, and we commonly do this by trying the testimony of one sense against that of another. The eye, for instance, may testify to a ghostly apparition, and we test its truth by touch or some other sense. If the senses agree we accept their testimony as true. In principle the same course is

often followed when an hypothesis is proposed for the explanation of a problem and carries with it a sense of important disagreement with our system of ideas, although the disagreement may not be exactly obvious. We hold it in suspense and investigate, to see whether the suspected disagreement is actual. If we discover that the discord is not manifest but only more or less remotely possible, the suspension of judgment which arrested the acceptance of the hypothesis gives way to the qualified acceptance discussed above.

The suspended judgment may be due, second, to the fact that two presentations which are clearly inconsistent with each other are offered to the mind at the same time; as, for instance, two mutually exclusive hypotheses which are proposed as alternative explanations of the same phenomenon. Each may have some points of agreement with the mental system, and neither may be in obvious discord with it. But while either hypothesis might, so far as its own credentials are concerned, be tentatively accepted, obvious conflict with one another will keep either from being adopted until investigation has determined which of them stands in the more obvious and general agreement with our organized experience.

Or, third, this attitude may be due to the fact that there is manifest disagreement between that which offers itself and the mental system in which it seeks incorporation. The opposition may be more or less radical; but in such a case the acceptance of the presentation will clearly necessitate a more or less profound reorganization of the mental life. The history of the conflict between science and theology is full of examples of this situation; indeed, it is a frequently recurring phenomenon in the progress of thought and in the development of each individual mind that rises above the level of simple traditionalism. But when this conflict takes place between a new idea and an old system of ideas and results in the specific mental attitude of doubt, it is evident that the disagreement is

not absolute; the new idea must find some point of attachment to the present mental organization, otherwise it would be instantly rejected and doubt, the attitude of suspended judgment, would not occur.

6. The mind may positively and unequivocally reject the new presentation—shut the door, so to speak, in its face. This is the attitude of the closed mind. The new idea is not given any showing at all. There is no suspension of judgment, no hanging fire, no investigation. Judgment is pronounced at once. The fact that its disagreement with the mental system is profound and that it would, if judged as real, necessitate a general reconstruction of the mental world makes the new idea too disturbing to minds that have reached a certain stage of crystallization. The whole mind as organized reacts against it and judges it as untrue. There is no doubt in the attitude of the closed mind. Its characteristic note is the immediate assertion of unconditional adherence to the existing system of beliefs and the simultaneous rejection of the presentation which conflicts with it. Of course, no mind becomes so completely crystallized as to resist unconditionally new ideas of every description; but it not unfrequently happens that one's system of ideas pertaining to some particular field of experience becomes so fixed as to exclude—automatically, so to speak—every suggestion which involves any change of importance. This is often noticeable in the domain of theology and politics. It is characteristic of the mental organization of those who have reached advanced age in a provincial environment.

Several important consequences may be deduced from the foregoing analysis of the mental functions, belief and doubt.

A. The specific character, the *quale*, of belief is *the acceptance of a presentation as true*. But what is meant by "true"? Without being led into a detailed discussion of this difficult question, an answer sufficient for our pres-

ent purpose is that the "truth" of a presentation means that it may be taken as a safe basis of action. Belief of a presentation means that one considers it safe to act upon it in appropriate circumstances. This is the true mark and measure of belief. All thinking has reference ultimately to action. One's mental system is his equipment for the direction and control of action, using the word in the general sense of conduct; and the reception of any new elements among his beliefs signifies the preparedness and purpose to act in accordance therewith when the occasion to do so arises. The function of mind is to receive impressions or presentations from the environment, treasure them, correlate them and translate them into suitable acts of adjustment. That which to a mind is suitable to be translated into action is to that mind the "true"; and is believed. That which the mind suspects is not suitable for action is doubted. The body of beliefs which one holds is his mental correlation with environment. By translating them into conduct as occasions arise he effects his adjustments to environment from moment to moment. There is, then, no fixed line of absolute demarcation between knowledge and belief. They overlap and shade into one another. Our knowledge consists of that body of beliefs that have been thoroughly tested and found by actual results to be sure and safe guides to action. Our belief which is not also knowledge consists of the body of judgments which have been incorporated in our mental systems but which have not as yet been sufficiently tested to stand within that narrower circle. Knowledge is thoroughly tested belief; and within this limit knowledge and belief are designations of the same mental content viewed from different angles.

We have spoken of doubt as a state or attitude of arrested belief, and this exactly indicates its true character. It has been said, and truly, that it is doubt which requires explanation, not belief.* It is natural, normal to believe.

* Pillsbury's *Psychology of Reasoning*. P. 25.

It is the primary function of the mind to receive impressions from the environment and translate them into adjustments. In other words it is its function to believe and govern action accordingly. Doubt arises in the arrest of this primary function through a conflict between the practical tendencies of these impressions. Out of this state of things issues the secondary function of mind, *thinking*, i. e., comparison, deliberation, the effort to bring these conflicting tendencies into harmony, to correlate them in a higher unity; and as the environment to which adjustment must be made by the highly developed person becomes exceedingly complex and changeful, this function comes to be so important that we ordinarily think of it as primary rather than secondary.

B. Doubt, then, in its very nature *is a temporary function*. Chronic doubt is hurtful, and ultimately ruinous. If it becomes permanent, it means the partial or complete suspension of the life-process in the sphere in which it obtains. Life is a process of adjustment, and doubt is an arrest of this process, and can be justified only as a step toward a more adequate adjustment, a wider and completer correlation with environment. It is like a surgical operation, which is intended to relieve a mal-adjustment of some sort; but a surgery which would keep a man's body perpetually on the operating table under the dissecting knife would be criminal. And doubt which keeps the mind in perpetual suspense would certainly result in the permanent maiming of the life in some of its functions, and if it became universal would destroy the personality. It would mean the abdication of both the primary and secondary functions of the mind. *Doubt is justifiable when, and only when, it is a temporary stage in the organization of a larger and more adequate belief.* As we climb up the mountain side to the higher altitudes whence we may have a wider outlook upon the universe of reality, it is often necessary that we

pass through belts of cloud; and that which justifies and rewards us for climbing through the choking mists is the grander prospect which opens out above them.

C. The closed mind, on the other hand, is equally fatal. It avoids the dangers of chronic doubt, but has dangers of its own that are just as great. It leads one by a different route to a different destination, but one that is as far removed from the true ends of life. The closed mind has a belief and is active, therefore; whereas the mind suspended in chronic doubt is paralyzed. But the closed mind directs its activity more and more *against* reality. The beliefs of such a mind represent a certain correlation with a certain order of envioning conditions. But this attitude of mind could be justified only on two grounds—(1) that those beliefs represent a perfect correlation with those conditions, (2) that those conditions undergo no change. We know as a matter of fact that neither of these assumptions is ever realized in the experience of finite minds. The correlation is never perfect and the envioning conditions are always changing. The closed mind, therefore, falls into an increasingly serious mal-adjustment to the actual conditions of life, which is only another way of saying into increasingly hurtful error and opposition to truth; and this means that its activities are ever increasingly destructive to itself and others. To assume this attitude is to abdicate both the primary and secondary functions of mind; for its primary function is to *receive* impressions from the environment, organize them into systems of beliefs and direct conduct according to them, and if all presentations not in agreement with the existing mental system are to be on that ground rejected this function is no longer performed so far as its most important value for life is concerned. It also means the discontinuance of the function of thinking, for the characteristic mark of thought is the comparison of ideas with one another and with one's system of ideas, and its positive value for

life is the resolution of conflicts between them, the elimination of the totally false and the correlation of those which are in any measure true into a higher unity, a larger truth. For the closed mind the thinking process does not pass beyond the primary stage of perceiving the disagreement with the present mental system, whereupon the new idea is instantly judged as false.

The only mental attitude, therefore, which is consistent with the maintenance and development of life is that of the open mind, which is exposed, indeed, to the dangers of doubt but which is also accessible to larger truth, whose shadow doubt so often is. In this attitude we may move forever upward toward the infinitely distant goal of absolute truth, the perfect mental correlation with the universe of reality. The open mind is as far removed from the paralysis of chronic doubt as it is from the dead crystallization of the mind which never doubts, because it refuses to think. The open mind is not at all inconsistent with positive conviction and constructive activity; rather the contrary. It has convictions that have been so thoroughly tested in the crucible of thought that opposing ideas can be met without awakening disturbing fears; and its activities are constructive, because the true definition of construction is the more perfect correlation of life with the environment.

D. If we compare the conditions under which belief and doubt occur and the conditions under which feeling arises, the intimate connection between them becomes apparent.

In the first place, it is evident that the act of belief, considered in and by itself alone, is always pleasantly toned, because it is an experience which falls in with and quickens the mental process actually going on. This, however, is often obscured by the fact that the content of the belief, the fact or statement believed, imposes a decided check upon the deeper instinctive tendencies and processes of life. The pleasure which the mere act of be-

lieving causes is thus submerged and lost in the stronger tide of unpleasantness caused by the disagreeable idea or fact believed. Likewise the suspense of doubt, in and by itself, is always unpleasant; except, perhaps, in the experience of the chronic doubter, who has formed the habit of doubt which each suspension of judgment coincides with and strengthens. And even then, as in the case of every bad habit, the experience is not one of pure or unmixed pleasure but is shot through with a vague unpleasantness due to the fact that the habit is in opposition to fundamental vital processes.

In the second place, it is apparent, not only that belief and doubt are accompanied by feeling-tones, but that these reactions are in some measure determined by feeling. Differences of opinion will exist as to the emphasis which should be put upon feeling as a factor in determining these attitudes, and perhaps it does not play an equally important role in their determination in all minds, because minds are very unequal in their capacity for feeling. Minds vary in sensibility; vary not only as to the keenness of the feeling awakened by the same stimulus but as to the strength of their feeling responses to stimuli in general. And, other things being equal, the mind of keen and delicate sensibility may possibly be more influenced by feeling in the acceptance of presentations than the mind of dull sensibility. At any rate, in minds of unusual sensibility the influence of the feelings in this respect is more apparent; though, perhaps, if we could lay bare the inner life of all minds we should discover that they differ from one another in this matter not as to the extent to which feeling influences the acceptance of new facts or ideas, but as to the intensity or positiveness of the beliefs so determined. The mind of extreme sensibility holds its beliefs more passionately, more dogmatically, than the mind of dull sensibility. Its beliefs have for it a value, a preciousness, which they do not

have for a mind of the opposite type; though probably feeling is equally potent in each in determining the content of belief.

But how does feeling operate in the determination of belief? Manifestly it is not the sole factor. It does not operate apart from one's organized experience as represented in his system of ideas. Belief is the acceptance of a presentation and its installment in this system of ideas based upon the perception of agreement between the two. Feeling, then, must become influential in determining belief by exercising some measure of control over the action of consciousness as organized in this system. It operates as a power behind the throne.

(1). It influences the direction of the attention. Feeling is the peculiar emphasis of meaning for the self with which each presentation is clothed as consciousness is directed upon it. It is obvious, then, that the specific feeling which accompanies the focalizing of consciousness upon a given object does not determine this act; but the mood, or the course of feeling, or the general emotional situation which is the resultant of the preceding mental activity will unquestionably influence the direction of the attention. Among the presentations filing in a continuous series across the threshold of the mind, some are singled out and given consideration; others pass on, receiving scant attention. The mind is interested in some of them and not in others, and towards the latter it assumes no definite conscious attitude. Towards the former it assumes a definite attitude, which as it develops must resolve itself into belief—acceptance as real; or doubt—hesitation to accept as real; or rejection—judgment as unreal. Feeling, therefore, has much to do in the direction of this selective process which singles out the presentation upon which consciousness is concentrated; and this surely is a most important function.

(2). Feeling not only has much to do in controlling the direction of the attention, but is also very influential

in determining the attitude which the mind takes toward the new object. Not only the general mood or state of feeling, but the specific feeling which accompanies the concentration of consciousness upon the object determines to a large extent how the mind will treat it. If the feeling excited by the presentation is distinctly unpleasant, it inevitably tends to induce hesitation, and this is practically another name for doubt. This is especially true if the feeling is one that arises out of the deep instinctive stratum of our mental life. The fact or idea against which a strong feeling raises this initial protest is not likely to be accepted until it has shown clear credentials, even though there may be no apparent intellectual inconsistency, no disagreement with the system of ideas. It will be required to give positive and convincing evidence of its right to stand in the circle of beliefs. The merely negative evidence of the absence of perceived disagreement will not suffice. If it runs counter to our desires, our inclinations, our hopes, it will be held up for further investigation or be instantly rejected. Moreover, while the investigation is going on its points of agreement with our mental system will be minimized and its points of disagreement magnified; points of disagreement will be diligently sought for and points of agreement will not be sought for. Throughout the whole process, therefore, feeling is active and powerfully influences the action of the mind. When the feeling aroused by the presentation is emphatically unpleasant it is rarely possible to keep the balances of the judgment even. The unpleasant feeling excites suspicion against the object, to begin with; acts as the sheriff to arrest the suspect; then assumes the role of detective to search out damaging evidence; plays attorney for the prosecution; undertakes to weigh the evidence as a juror, and even seeks to interpret the law as judge. It is omnipresent, urgent, subtly influencing the proceedings at every stage. Perhaps it becomes too busy and domineering and

in the highly organized person may cause a reaction by awakening some counter feeling, such as mental self-respect, or the love of truth for truth's sake, or the sense of justice; and in this way only can the original feeling of displeasure evoked by the disagreeable idea or fact be checked and held within proper limits. But in persons whose mental development is not high the feeling, pleasant or unpleasant, called forth by a presentation generally secures a verdict for or against it unless the evidence the other way is overwhelming. The speaker who wishes to secure assent to a proposition will always find himself rowing against a powerful current if it excites decidedly disagreeable feeling. If, on the other hand, the feeling aroused is a distinctly pleasant one, he finds himself sailing with both wind and current in his favor. If no disagreement with the system is apparent the presentation meets with no opposition; unless, as previously indicated, its appearance is so strange as by itself to excite suspicion of its truth; and even this constitutes no real exception, because when the strangeness is so striking it indicates a certain lack of harmony with the mental system and it prevents the full development of the pleasant feeling-tone. When the feeling is decidedly agreeable the desire awakened directs attention to the points of agreement with the mental system, and diverts attention from the disagreements; underscores the former and leaves the latter unemphasized even when they are too obvious to be wholly overlooked; searches for agreements, which it is likely to find because it seeks for them; and, unless by its excesses it starts into activity some counter-feeling which enters the game, or unless the disagreements with one's systematized experience are so numerous, distinct and obtrusive as to render reconciliation impossible, it will probably secure the mind's assent to the new presentation.

Now, when we reflect that the majority of the contents of our intellectual system have secured their intro-

duction into it through these processes, it is apparent that, while feeling does not exercise an absolute control—since many unpleasant things have to be accepted—it has been a most potent factor in the organization of our whole system of belief; and, through its extensive control over the activity of the system which it has been so potent in forming, is constantly influencing the incorporation of new materials in it.

If we look back over the foregoing analysis of mental attitudes, we perceive that there are three general classes of beliefs—those which have their basis in the natural credulity of the mind, those which rest principally upon positive agreement with the intellectual system, and those which derive their certification chiefly from powerful feelings that spring from our instinctive organization. The first can be referred to the suggestibility of the mind; the second to its rationality; the third, if I may coin a word, to its affectability, i. e., to its capacity for suffering and enjoyment. We are beings who have conscious needs and desires, who must live or die and who crave life. Out of this deep instinctive substratum of our nature rise longings for certain kinds of satisfactions, and these longings generate belief in the reality of those objects which are necessary to their satisfaction.

We may distinguish, then, primitive credulity, rational belief and vital conviction. Credulity believes things because it is told that they are true. It is natural and beautiful in the child, because the child has had but little experience and has, therefore, no well established positive standard of critical judgment. In credulity its mental life normally begins. But it does not by any means excite our admiration when we observe it in the grown person, because the grown person has had experience and opportunity to organize his intellectual life, and thus should be equipped to weigh and consider all presentations that seek admittance to his mind. We consider it, therefore, abnormal and reprehensible for him,

in matters of important concern, to accept what he is told without the exercise of his own reason. In no matter of great practical importance should his belief rest blindly upon authority, the subjective correlate of which is suggestibility, but should have its roots in himself, should be tested in the crucible of his own intellect. If he believes the statements of others it should be not the mere acquiescence of credulity but the assent of a rationally acting mind. Vital conviction also stands in antithesis to credulous belief, but not to rational belief. It is not inconsistent with the latter but is distinct from it in principle. By its very nature its content is often not subject to final ratification by the logical faculty. That content, however, should not be inconsistent with the rational conclusions of the mind; and if such an inconsistency appears the strength of the vital faith is weakened in proportion to the depth of that antagonism. There should be agreement between the two in order to secure inward peace and unity and a high degree of practical efficiency. And on the whole there is a tendency for the two types of belief to coincide. Sometimes it happens that a man builds up a belief on what seems to him a rational basis, and subsequently, when a powerful stimulation of the instinctive nature occurs, finds that this belief denies satisfaction to some of his most vital longings. Then he suffers distress of mind, and in the long run the more frail structure of the belief which is mainly logical in character will usually give way and he will build a structure of belief that is consistent with the central cravings of his nature; though such a fortunate adjustment does not always take place, and the person is then left with a permanent and more or less painful discord in his mental life. Such situations have been frequent in the history of religion. It often happens that a man will entertain a belief of the credulous or rational type, which has comparatively little influence upon his life until some powerful stimulation of his instinctive nature vivifies it and

converts it into a vital conviction. Many a man accepts the existence of God through social suggestion, or as a result of reasoning; but the belief remains to a large extent formal and inoperative until in some great crisis his vital longing for divine fellowship and support is awakened and the realization of God becomes the source of his deepest satisfaction and the controlling influence in his conduct.

The distinction between these types of belief must not be understood to imply that feeling is not operative in the formation of all of them. The distinction lies, first, in the different degrees and modes of influence exerted by the intellect and the feelings in their formation; and, second, in the operation of a special class of feelings in building up vital conviction. Feeling has comparatively little to do with what is accepted by the credulous mind under the influence of suggestion; although it is far from being an insignificant factor. In rational belief the intellect plays a far more positive role than in credulity and a far more dominant role than in vital belief; though feeling has a more definite and important part in it than in credulity. In vital faith, as already indicated, a special class of feelings which spring from the deepest depths of our nature are the controlling factor. The sponsor, the guarantor of vital faith is neither external authority nor the intellectual system, but the fundamental needs of human nature voicing themselves in powerful emotions when deep instincts are excited.

One's real religious faith, stripped of all the remnants or accretions of credulity, belongs to the class of vital beliefs. It is the affirmation of the reality of the supersensible objects and relations which are felt to be necessary for the satisfaction of the fundamental needs of the personality. It declares that back of all sensory experience—the material universe—are beings, activities, tendencies, ends which constitute the ultimate meaning of all life. In this faith the cognitive activity is

motivated by deep instinctive longings and is only negatively controlled by the intellectual system, sometimes, indeed, results in a reconstruction of that system. It has been truly said: "the soul likes to project that which is most deeply rooted in its own being furthest beyond itself. The objective lies for it, so to speak, in the middle distance; but that which is inmost, which originates in the most subjective stratum of the soul, it extends from itself into an Absolute, Over-objective."* That is, our own inmost heart postulates for us a universe of reality that lies beyond this objective world of the senses. The formulation of this reality is the work of the intellect, but in that work it is controlled by affection and desire. The soul, using the imagination as a brush, paints the far background of existence in the colors of its own intimate feelings. We require a spiritual world which will answer and satisfy our central cravings. Thus the Psalmist cried, "My soul thirsteth for God."

Since, however, we are under the necessity of *conceiving*, of clothing in intellectual forms, the supersensible reality which the heart postulates, no little trouble arises in the realm of belief. The materials which the intellect uses are sensuous images. Its most abstract constructions are built up of these images. We have to dress up the supersensible in the garments furnished by the senses. When the intellect has thus formulated what the heart has postulated in the realm beyond the senses, these forms themselves cannot be changed without a profound disturbance of the heart. But as the intellectual system undergoes reorganization, as it inevitably must in active minds, those forms, which are part and parcel of that system, must share in the reconstruction. Hence arises religious doubt. If, as sometimes happens, the intellect in its reconstituted system of ideas repudiates entirely these forms, and undertakes by itself to give an account of all reality, the result is a rationalistic

* Simmel. *Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie*. P. 154.

philosophy, which inevitably leaves the deeper cravings of the heart unsatisfied. Such a system cannot long endure. The heart will make its demands heard. On the other hand, if the heart demands that the forms in which its postulates have been clothed by the intellect shall never be altered, one of two results will inevitably follow—either intellectual growth will be arrested, or else the old forms will be filled with a new content of meaning. The struggle between the head and the heart is one of the significant phenomena of our time. In some persons their reconciliation is never effected. The most notable example, perhaps, of this refusal of the head and heart to co-operate was Herbert Spencer. There is singular pathos in the closing words of his Autobiography. After discussing the vastness of the manifold mystery of the universe and declaring the impotency of the intellect to comprehend it, he adds: "And along with this rises the paralyzing thought—what if, of all that is thus incomprehensible to us, there exists no comprehension anywhere? No wonder that men take refuge in authoritative dogma! * * * Thus religious creeds, which in one way or other, occupy the sphere which rational interpretation seeks to occupy and fails, and fails the more, the more it seeks, I have come to regard with sympathy based on community of need; feeling that dissent from them results from inability to accept the solutions offered, joined with a wish that solutions could be found." He was only a distinguished member of that large, and probably growing, community of souls whose hearts require a religious interpretation of the universe, but whose intellectual systems are in disagreement with any such interpretation as has been offered.

There is a still larger number who have not repudiated all religious interpretations, leaving their hearts in naked want, but are more or less conscious of lack of harmony between their systems of thought and these interpretations, and yet strive to hold on to both. They

can take refuge on neither horn of the dilemma. There is a lack of unity in their inner lives. The sense of uncertainty hangs like a discouraging shadow over their mental life, not paralyzing but relaxing the nerve of religious faith. The equilibrium of their faith is very unstable. It has a very insecure support in intellectual forms. It stands like a tree clinging with a few roots to the bank of the stream whose waters have nearly deprived it of sustaining earth.

On the other hand, we should not forget that there is a species of doubt which originates in personal inclinations. Feeling may generate doubt as well as faith. Evil habits of life often give rise to feelings which repel a religious conception of the world, and influence the intellect to question the existence of a holy supreme Being and the moral order of the world. The debauchee, the thief, the murderer have very powerful reasons, not of the intellectual but of the emotional type, for wishing that the world were without a moral meaning or a moral ruler; and in this region of the mental life, more absolutely than in any other, "the wish is father to the thought."

In conclusion some paragraphs must be given to the consideration of the practical question toward which this discussion has looked from the beginning; namely, the preacher's relation to religious doubt. The question as it relates to the preacher's own doubts can not here be considered in detail; but, it may now be remarked that his attitude toward other doubters will be necessarily influenced by his own experience. Every case of doubt is clearly a special problem and should be dealt with as such. Personal idiosyncrasies figure largely in each, and only general rules can be laid down. But in any case the preacher's primary duty is to *understand*. It is the especial function of preaching *to present religious truth in such a way as to secure its intelligent and whole-hearted acceptance, and through genuine belief to influence conduct in right directions*. But if the preacher be

ignorant of the nature of doubt and of the conditions under which it arises, his dealing with it will be unintelligent, misdirected and often disastrous. In general it may also be said that sympathetic treatment alone is appropriate and effective. Denunciation, while it has its limited function in preaching, should never be used to bring the doubter to the belief of the truth. The preacher who in such cases indulges in denunciation with the notion that he is following the example of Jesus makes a capital mistake from which knowledge of the nature of doubt would have saved him. Those cases which called forth the lightning-like denunciations of Jesus were typical examples not of doubt, but of the closed mind, a mental state which lies at the opposite extreme from doubt. There is, of course, a form of doubt which is sometimes called dishonest, and dishonesty should always be severely dealt with. But careful discrimination should be exercised in this matter. If doubt really exists, no matter what influences have induced it, it is a real state of mental uncertainty; and denunciation is misdirected if aimed at this state. It should be directed rather at those courses of conduct which have induced it. If evil courses of conduct have resulted in doubt concerning religious verities, it should be remembered that deeper down than these perverse habits are the old vital needs which when they can find voice, speak always in favor of the religious interpretation of the world. To remove the doubt thus originated, the most effective method is to awaken from their somnolence these vital needs and bring them into consciousness, that the soul may be flooded with those primal and powerful feelings on the waves of which faith rides to rightful dominion. Criticism of the immoral conduct, coupled with sincere sympathy for the transgressor, is the appropriate means for the preacher to use. To denounce the doubt as such is more likely to strengthen than to dispel it. To demonstrate that the doubt is not justified on in-

tellectual grounds is ineffective, because it did not really originate in the inconsistency of faith with the intellectual system, and therefore a merely logical reconciliation of the two will not remove it. If the mere disagreeableness of the religious doctrine has been the only real cause of its being held in the suspense of doubt—as is the case in the kind of doubt we are now considering—it is only necessary in order to turn the tables in its favor to arouse a more powerful counter-feeling which springs from a lower depth of the personality.

But it is a more difficult problem to deal effectively with the doubt which arises from a real conflict between the postulates of faith and the intellectual system of the doubter. Here denunciation is manifestly absurd. Denunciation implies moral dereliction; and in this case the doubter is conscious that moral dereliction is not the source of his doubt. Harsh criticism, the prophecy of future calamity, dogmatic assertion of every kind fall wide of the mark and are likely to be interpreted as the mere rage of intellectual impotency. The rational aspect of the doubt must be squarely met, and should be met in the broadest and fairest spirit. Just as in dealing with the class of doubters referred to above, personal sympathy and kindness are of the utmost importance; but genuine intellectual sympathy is needed also, and it is not always easy for the preacher to have this. The psychological reason for this difficulty may be readily perceived. The mental processes involved in the exercise of the ministerial function render it easier for the preacher to maintain an attitude of belief than for persons engaged in other occupations. We do not mean to attribute to ministers of religion any thing more than the ordinary weaknesses of human nature, when we say that the fact that it is to his professional and economic interest to maintain that attitude may not be without some degree of unconscious influence upon him. It is only to assume that he is normally human. He must maintain

an attitude of positive belief in order to be successful in the work to which he has devoted his life. Not only does doubt, especially if it become chronic, cripple his real effectiveness, but a reputation for heresy endangers the prospect of his securing employment by the churches. Of course, if the latter consideration comes to figure even semi-consciously in the determination of his attitude, he is dwelling next door to downright dishonesty; and a general acquaintance with preachers forbids the assumption of this as a consciously operating motive in the lives of any except a small and contemptible minority of them. On the contrary I am persuaded that in many instances, the knowledge of the danger of being subconsciously influenced by this material consideration leads many conscientious men to entertain suggestions of doubt which, perhaps, otherwise would not trouble them, and to search their minds with an excessive keenness of scrutiny. However, after all has been said, it would be an assumption of their superiority to ordinary human limitations to suppose that good ministers are never subject to the unconscious operation of this influence.

But apart from this, the characteristic direction of the preacher's attention tends to keep his mind focussed upon the religious needs of men; these needs are more constantly vocal in his own consciousness and more apparent to him in the lives of others than is the case with men in other occupations. When he contemplates the intellectual problems of faith, he approaches them, therefore, with a more pronounced bias in favor of the reality of the objects of belief than other men usually do. The reasons *for* receive a relatively greater emphasis and the reasons *against* a relatively weaker one than they do in most other minds engaged in these investigations. Other things, therefore, being equal, the preacher's peculiar point of view and modes of thought render it easier for him than for most other men to maintain an attitude of positive belief. Other things, to be sure, are not always

equal; and hence it should not be invariably assumed as a matter of course that others are more troubled by doubts than the minister. Especially should we bear in mind that the minister, if he uses his opportunities for study as he should, will become acquainted with many of the intellectual difficulties pertaining to religion which many of his hearers who are not engaged in intellectual pursuits never have to wrestle with, and their belief will, therefore, not be subjected to such severe tests as his. But we repeat that, *other things being equal*, he will find it easier than others to maintain a positive belief in the realities of religion. For this reason his intellectual sympathy with doubters is likely to be deficient. Openness of mind as to these matters is likely to decrease with the years; and without conscious effort, motivated by desire to keep in sympathy with those who are struggling with the intellectual problems of religion, his bark may be found at last, with furled sails, stranded in stagnant waters which have been cut off by the drifting sands from the deep currents and strong winds of the open sea.

If the preacher's mission is to get the truths of religion believed, it is essential that he should present them in a way to render the perplexed and questioning minds of this age accessible to them. At the same time it is equally important that he, while apprehending and appreciating the difficulties of the doubter, should hold and present his beliefs with the positiveness of assured conviction. The doubter is not assisted in the attainment of mental unity by discovering that the preacher has question marks parenthetically inserted after all his statements. The preacher should certainly be a believer, a genuine and enthusiastic believer; but an open-minded believer. His beliefs should not be of the hot-house variety, whose life can be assured only by keeping them in an atmosphere artificially warmed under a glass cover, with roots protected from the chilly soil; but should have the health and hardihood of the plant that thrives and

grows amidst the winds and frost of the open air. It is only thus that he can secure the confidence of the doubter; and this is a matter of the first importance. When the doubters have become convinced that he is a brave and intelligent believer who has not shrunk from looking squarely in the eye the most frowning difficulties, whose crown of faith is lustrous because it has been fairly won upon the battle-field, their hearts more readily open to him and the firm utterance of his convictions stirs deeper depths in their souls. The preacher is too often insulated from his doubting hearers because they have the impression that he would have less assurance if he had more knowledge, and would be less dogmatic if he had more courage. But the preacher who can convince his hearers of his open-mindedness, his absolute sincerity and his intellectual courage and yet proclaims his inspiring message with a sure note of positive conviction, blended with a note of sincere sympathy with those who have not been able to attain to his assurance, will grip the mind and heart of this perplexed and questioning age. He will be a real defender of the faith, because he will be a builder of the faith.

BOOK REVIEWS

I. RELIGION AND MISSIONS.

The Philosophy of Religion. By George Galloway, D.Phil., D.D., New York, 1914, Charles Scribner's Sons. xii+602 pp. \$2.50 net.

The "International Theological Library" engaged the late Professor Flint to write its volume on the Philosophy of Religion. When it was impossible for him to do it the work was laid upon one who had been his pupil. The production while a reasonably satisfactory work can hardly be ranked as superior. Its positions are cautious and conservative without being timid or in any way merely traditional. Its method is in harmony with modern ideas, in that it begins with the phenomenological and follows the principle of evolution. It seeks, therefore, to generalize and interpret the facts of religious history. Up to this point religious ideas have been treated as ideas and their development in the experience of mankind and influence on his general development shown. It is now necessary to treat of the reality of these ideas, their objective validity. Before coming to this, however, the author has an extended discussion of epistemology in which he makes a strong and somewhat original argument for religious knowledge. The basal distinction between scientific knowledge and religious knowledge it seems to me has been overlooked.

The validity of religious ideas is developed along sound lines with rather more of conservatism than the case might admit. In particular the author seems to me quite unnecessarily reticent about the worth of the old arguments for the existence of God. He conceives them too narrowly and rejects them on insufficient ground. In the development of religion differentiating influences could have received fuller treatment and especially should more attention have been paid to the influences of religious founders and prophets. The account of the relation of morals and

religion I am unable to approve and I am especially unable to accept the theory that ethical conscience is a delayed product by way of evolution of the law of tribal custom. The idea of redemption in religion is almost overlooked, which surely is unexpected in the Philosophy of Religion. But the defects of the book are chiefly negative and it is always possible to find fault. Apart from a too critical balancing of ideas and so a lack of definiteness the positive elements of the work are mainly quite satisfactory. It has the advantage of readable size. For class work it is well adapted.

W. O. CARVER.

The Gods of India: A Brief Description of Their History, Character and Worship. By the Rev. E. Osborn Martin, for 13 years a Wesleyan Methodist Missionary in India and Ceylon; with 68 illustrations and map. London: J. M. Dent & Sons. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1914. xviii+330 pp. \$1.50 net.

The author has undertaken one of the most difficult tasks in the study of religion. Worship could hardly be more complicated than in India today. The multiplicity of gods, the varieties of their legends, the confusion of their mythology, the unconcern for consistency and logic, all make difficult in the extreme any satisfactory account of India's gods. Our author has not undertaken a scientific study but a popular presentation. He is giving us not so much the results of personal investigation and reflection as a collection of stories, accounts and views gathered from leading writers. He has systematized his material and classified the gods so as to make as intelligible as may be to occidental readers the really incomprehensible workings of religion, superstition and folk lore in a richly varied group of Orientals.

The illustrations are good and contribute greatly to the interest and value of the book. And while the work is not one to satisfy scientific students of religion it brings to the average reader more, and more nearly what he wants, of the Hindu thought of deity than he will be able to find within the same compass elsewhere.

W. O. CARVER.

The Distinctive Ideas of Jesus. By Charles Carroll Albertson, Minister of the Lafayette Avenue Presbyterian Church, Blooklyn, N. Y. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1914. 144 pp. 75c, net.

Not very profound but thoroughly sane, delightfully well written, wholly loyal are these lectures in Comparative Religion. They are popular in purpose and wholly suited to the purpose. Nowadays when so many hear of the study of religion and so few really engage in the study it is of vital importance that correct ideas of the distinctive value of Christianity among religions shall be presented to cultured congregations, and the supreme importance that Christianity shall be given to all men. No people ought to be allowed to remain with any religion without being made aware of the best religion. This book presents seven characteristic excellencies of Christianity and discusses them with understanding and conviction. One would wish to find the element of redemption more emphasized.

W. O. CARVER.

A Fourfold Test of Mormonism. By Henry C. Sheldon, Professor in Boston University. The Abingdon Press, New York and Cincinnati. 151 pp. 50c net.

With the keen directness of fact and reason Professor Sheldon has condemned the modern marvel of abominable form under which polygamous indulgence has first cloaked itself in a religious system and then fortified itself in political organization, condemned it by the tests of the history of its founder and course, criticism of its foundation and teaching, reasoned exposition of its follies in thought and theology, fair estimate of its practical working in social and national life. The work is conveniently brief, logically clear, delightfully readable, convincing to any open mind.

Studies of Missionary Leadership. The Smyth Lectures for 1913, delivered before the Columbia Theological Seminary, Columbia, South Carolina, by Robert E. Speer. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1914. 283 pp. \$1.50 net.

There are six of these lectures, discussing missionary theory, problems and method from the standpoint of their personal apprehension, presentation or solution in the official experiences of missionary statesmen. For each lecture one man is taken as the embodiment of the ideas there to be presented and a short account is given of his biography and service. He is made to live before the reader, meeting and solving the various questions that arise in missionary administration at home and abroad. Three of the men were home secretaries, one an active organizer in Chile, one a Japanese and one an Indian. Besides the chief characters many others come forward who were associated with these in work and planning. It is the best method of study and in Mr. Speer's hands the method has been well used. The book is quite worth while for any student of missions. I would especially recommend it for missionary secretaries, board members, missionary managers on foreign fields and all those amateur critics of boards and secretaries to be found in all demoninations.

W. O. CARVER.

The Coming and Kingdom of Christ: A Stenographic Report of the Prophetic Bible Conference Held at the Moody Bible Institute of Chicago, February 24-27, 1914. Including a list of Some Exponents of Premillennarianism. Chicago, 1914. The Bible Institute Colportage Association. 252 pp.

About thirty speakers participated in the conference here reported and their discussions cover a wide range of the topics connected with the subject of the plan and the consummation of the Gospel era. The speakers are representative and are able students of the Bible. They all agree in the belief in a visible coming of Christ prior to a millennial period of peaceful reign, to be followed by a brief time of violent wickedness and warfare which in turn will be followed by the winding up of the course of redemptive history of humanity with the General Judgment and the absolute reign of God. It would be too much to expect agreement in details of interpretation and application of the prophecies. Through it all there runs the basal error that *prophecy* is primarily *predictive revelation* giving a forecast of

history. While this is an element in prophecy it is never the purpose of prophecy to write history beforehand. Prophecy seeks to shape history by influencing present conduct under the inspiration of assured success of righteousness, redemption and glory. In one of his addresses Dr. C. I. Scofield says (p. 180): "Beware of phrases." That warning needs to be heeded throughout this work, although it was not intended to apply to this. Those who make schemes in detail of the order of events in the consummation of the age are the victims of phrases and are guilty of making up mosaics of scriptures detached from their context and original application. The unreliability of such results is sufficiently evident from the various patterns of the mosaics. The main lines of the addresses of this conference are rational and scriptural and they tend to develop that fine hope that characterizes the devout servants of the Lord who have loved His appearing. It is easily the most serviceable volume on the subject and the subject is one of great interest not alone for curiosity but even more for loyal piety.

W. O. CARVER.

Missionary Programs and Incidents. By George H. Trull, author of "Missionary Methods for Sunday School Workers," "Five Missionary Minutes, First Series"; Editor of Missionary Studies for the Sunday School, First, Second and Third Series. New York, 1914. Missionary Education Movement of the United States and Canada. ix+274 pp. 50c.

The full title page explains that this is a Second Series of *Five Missionary Minutes* providing material for platform use in the Sunday school for fifty-two Sundays in the year. This material is arranged in fifteen-minute programs and five-minute incidents, some of which are illustrated. That the whole is admirably arranged and adapted, no one who knows Dr. Trull or has used his *Five Missionary Minutes* will need to be told. It is a fine course of lessons for use in instructing and inspiring in home and foreign missions. It can be used in any Sunday school and should at least be a help for such work in every Sunday school.

Besides the fifty-two programmes there are programmes for all the special days to be found in the plans of the Sunday schools.

Educational Missions. By James L. Barton, Secretary, A. B. C. F. M., Author of "Daybreak in Turkey," etc. New York, Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1913. 271 pp. \$1.25.

No phase of foreign missions is more urgently interesting just now than that of education. Much is being written about it. No one is more competent to write of it than Dr. Barton and here he has taken up all aspects of the question and presented them with clearness. His own views are wise and reasonable, but the reader will find facts and considerations so presented as to afford him material for his own conclusions. There is no other book in which the whole subject is so completely gone over and this one should have a very wide reading. A list of books on education selected by Dr. T. H. P. Sailer is a valuable appendix. Other appendices give general statistics of educational missions and details of many leading institutions.

The New Era in Asia. By Sherwood Eddy, Author of "India Awakening." New York, 1913. Education Department, Foreign Mission Board, Richmond, Va. xiv+229 pp. 50c net.

This mission study text book, already much used, will continue to be in great demand. It is a comprehensive survey of all Asia with the salient facts well brought out for each country. The illustrations and map add greatly to its effectiveness.

II. PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

1. HOMILETICAL AND DEVOTIONAL.

The Human Nature of the Saints. By George Hodges, Dean of the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Mass. The Macmillan Company, New York. 244 pp. \$1.25 net. A new edition.

This is a collection of nineteen sermons. The style is simple but striking. The thoughts are clear and the message strikes

modern life at many points. The author scores men of modern times for "detraction"—the slander of leaders in the church and state who need our "appreciation." In the second sermon he exhorts the church and labor unions to be charitable to those who differ from them, and not to be dogmatic as to the rightness of their position, for "nobody is completely right."

The author drags into his sermons many points of radical criticism. On page 6 he says, "It is not absolutely certain" that Jesus used the words, "Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers, etc.," because they do not occur in Luke as well as in Matthew. A better explanation would be that Luke naturally omitted these words because of the polish of his cultured friend Theophilus and their repugnance to his own refined nature. On page 73 f. he says, "So it is with the story of the temptation of Christ. It has no place in the world of fact. Taken literally, it never happened." This is surely an extreme stroke of the spiritualizing process. On p. 98 f. he says, "The old notion that in a miracle God broke in upon the course of nature is no longer held by instructed and intelligent persons." One would scarcely suppose that a scientific critic could be so dogmatic.

The author minimizes the real religious experience of the soul with the personal Christ. On p. 129, he represents Christ as saying to the rich young man, "Do right; be good; so shalt thou be saved." On p. 153 he says that what this young man lacked was, "earnest social purpose."

The most helpful addresses are: The Wisdom of the Wise Men; The Damnation of Dives; The Unbelief of Thomas; Blind Bartimaeus; The Mission of Philip; The Lord's Brothers; One From Ten; Saints in Summer; The Disciple Whom Jesus Loved; The Satisfaction of Religion. The book makes good reading, if one notes the objections mentioned above.

C. B. WILLIAMS.

A Man's Reach, or Some Character Ideals. By Charles Edward Locke. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. \$1.00 net.

This is a series of brilliant essays on topics not related. Occasionally the language is a little bombastic. But usually the author's descriptions are graphic and beautiful. His discussions are excellent in chapters II, V, VI, VII, X, XV, XVI and XVII. Especially the last two chapters on "Getting Along with Folks" and "Master, Say On," are helpful and inspiring.

The book is full of fine nuggets of thought, suitable for quotations. "He who achieves an ideal becomes a high priest of the PERFECT ONE," "Character is the fine art of giving up," "Character is God investing and expressing himself in man." "The man who loses his passion in his work has really lost his mission," "The doubter loses faith in himself, and that is suicide; he loses faith in God, and that is tragedy; and he loses faith in his fellows, and that is misanthropy." "The rich man's palace is full of everything but happiness—it lacks nothing but happiness." "If we had more faith we should have more life." "More service makes more life." "In self-mastery selfhood begins." "God builds men great by training them in doing small things well." "He should stand on the street corner some day and watch himself go by." "The world will not outgrow Him (Christ) because it will not outgrow womanhood, for every woman who makes the mysterious journey through the sublime miracle and exquisite ecstasy of motherhood solemnly and gratefully remembers that Jesus Christ, her Lord and Redeemer, was throbbled into being under a woman's heart." "Death is the graduation of the soul; it is the commencement of life; it is the gateway to glory; it is the Glistening Portal to fadeless immortality."

W. O. CARVER.

Thinking God's Thoughts After Him; A Retired Man's Meditations.

By Henry Melville King, D.D., Pastor Emeritus of the First Baptist Church, Providence, R. I. Boston: The Gorham Press, 1914. 284 pp. \$1.25 net.

These meditations of a retired Baptist pastor are published under five captions: Certainty of Faith; The Bible, Our Great Educational Asset; The Church of Christ in the Nineteenth

Century; Peace and Light on the Cross, in Interpretation; Mrs. Emma Willard, the Pioneer in the Higher Education of Women. There is no logical connection between the five chapters except that the first chapter forms an apt introduction to the next three chapters which discuss the great trio of Christian fundamentals, the Bible, the Church, and the Cross.

In the first chapter the author contends that the certainty of faith is the product of Christian experience, that Christian experience authenticates the certainty of faith. The author properly exalts experience of spiritual truth as a paramount need in modern times. Especially must the preacher be a man of deep spiritual experience and have a definite message, if the pulpit retains its power. "A minister without definite faith, born of a vital Christian experience and certified as to its divine character, would be out of place in the Christian pulpit."

In his second paper, in charming style, revealing familiarity with all the best that the great authors, scientists, philosophers, and theologians have said about the Bible, the author exalts the educational value of the Bible in our school systems. He shows particularly how it contributes to the literary taste and moral power of those who study its style and learn its teachings. He pleads that the Bible, if not *in toto*, at any rate, those literary and ethical gems, the Ten Commandments, the stories of Joseph and of Esther, Job, portions of the Psalms, Isaiah, Amos, Hosea, the Life of Christ in Mark, the Sermon on the Mount, John 14—17, the Life of Paul, First Corinthians 13, "the Immortal Panegyric of Love," should have a place in the curricula of our public schools. He makes a strong argument for this use of the Bible in our public schools, but many Baptists will not accept this position as consistent with the Baptist view of liberty of conscience.

In the third paper the author discusses the achievements of Christianity in the nineteenth century; its phenomenal advance in missionary activities; its building of Christian colleges, especially for young women; its philanthropic enterprises; its beneficent social service; its contribution to private and public morals, especially combating and curbing the evils of intemperance,

human slavery, gambling and the lottery. The author correctly maintains that Christianity is life, social and ethical, as well as doctrine; that the great doctrines produce moral movements and ethical living. He is optimistic as to the world and Christianity in the twentieth century. "It can be said with absolute confidence that the world is a better world to live in than the world of a hundred years ago, and that it is a better church which lives in it."

It is to be noted that the author uses the term "the Church of Christ" in a loose sense not found in the New Testament, "as descriptive of the varied visible forms of organized Christianity" (page 136).

In the fourth chapter he interprets the dying words of Christ, "It is finished," to mean the accomplishment of the eternal purpose of God, the fulfillment of the promises and rites of the Old Testament, and in the completion of Christ's mission on earth to reveal God and save man.

In the fifth chapter we have a high tribute paid to Mrs. Emma Willard as "the pioneer," "the apostle of the higher education of woman," who founded the first real woman's college in the United States at Troy, New York, 1821.

C. B. WILLIAMS.

The Joy of Finding, or God's Humanity and Man's Inhumanity to Man. An Exposition of Luke xv. 11-32. By Rev. Alfred E. Garvie, M.A., D.D., Principal of New College, London. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914. v+138 pp. 60 cts. net.

In this volume of the popular "Short Course Series" Principal Garvie has given us a delightfully fresh, comprehensive, illuminating and suggestive exposition of the direct and implied teaching of the "Parable of the Prodigal Son." It is such a book as should have the widest possible reading. The position that God does not know the decisions of men until they are made is singularly superficial in Dr. Garvie, introducing the element of time into the consciousness of God.

The Prayers of St. Paul. By the Rev. W. H. Griffith Thomas, D.D., Professor of Old Testament Literature and Exegesis, Wyckliffe College, Toronto. New York, 1914. Charles Scribner's Sons. vii+144 pp. 60c net.

A volume in the excellent "Short Course Series," this study of the prayers of the great Apostle is suggestive and useful without being marked by any great measure of penetration. For personal devotion and for instruction the interpretations and comments are valuable, but it is not possible to say that they always follow the mind of the Apostolic author. Particularly in the case of the prayer in Ephesians III has the writer failed to grasp the fundamental ideas, almost wholly.

The subject of these studies are of great importance and this little volume will be very helpful. It is heartily commended.

A Prayer to Begin the Day. By John Timothy Stone. Philadelphia, 1914. The Westminster Press. Small 16-mo; 180 pp. 25c.

A neat little book of good brief prayers, admirably suited to their purpose.

2. SOCIOLOGICAL.

The Immigration Problem: A Study of American Immigration Conditions and Needs. By Jeremiah W. Jenks, Ph.D., LL.D., and W. Jett Lauck. Third Edition, revised and enlarged. Funk & Wagnalls Company. New York, 1913. xxiii+551 pp. \$1.75 net.

They Who Knock at Our Gates: A Complete Gospel of Immigration. By Mary Antin, with illustrations by Joseph Stella. Boston and New York: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1914. xi+143 pp. \$1.00 net.

Here are two books for every student of immigration, and for the million more who ought to be students of this subject. So much has been written in the current magazines and daily press on the subject during recent agitations for fresh legislation that one really wants to know facts and principles on which to base a righteous opinion. Thus alone can we be saved from emotional judgments of prejudice. The work of Jenks and Lauck is a veritable encyclopedia of facts. Both men were active

in the work of the former government commission on immigration and have epitomized in this volume the facts of the forty volumes of the official report. Dr. Jenks is now professor in the New York University and Professor Lauck formerly taught Economics and Politics in Washington and Lee.

Various theoretical questions about immigration will here find the answer of facts carefully analyzed and arranged. Full accounts are given of various acts and bills of congress for regulation. Who the immigrants are and what sort, how they live and where, what they do and can do: it is all found here both in tables of statistics and in well written account.

Then let Mary Antin from the text of the American Declaration of Independence preach you the "Gospel of Immigration" in three sermons dealing with "First: A question of principle: Have we any right to regulate immigration?

Second: A question of fact: What is the nature of our present immigration?

Third: A question of interpretation: Is immigration good for us?"

Her discussion is not one of figures and tables, from which she thinks no true conclusions can be reached to guide conduct. She discusses principles with all the eloquent fervor of righteous conviction. The cold calculations of critical experts mean nothing for the apostle of human rights. Principles may not be determined by prudence, itself the calculating daughter of selfish reason and cold statistics. Facts are useful and find use in this discussion but it is essentially a fervid appeal to basal ideas in the support of high ideals. And aside from its main purpose every lover of eloquent, beautiful and picturesque English rhetoric would want to read this book for that alone, if for nothing else. It is a rare work in literary qualities.

W. O. CARVER.

Social Forces in England and America. By H. G. Wells, author of "The Future of America," "Socialism and the Great State," etc. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1914. 420 pp. \$2.00 net.

No matter what Mr. Wells writes about he is worth reading, and he writes about very many things. Little lies beyond his range and nothing beyond his undertaking. This book is a collection of essays about which the reader quickly comes to agree with the author when he says it contains "a fairly complete view of all my opinions," whether or not the reader also agrees that they have been "edited and drawn together into an effective whole." There is not much unity surely, but that matters little. Here are "opinions" about war and especially prospective (from the standpoint of the writing) British war that it is interesting to compare with current events. Thus far Mr. Wells is not largely justified as military and naval critic, but the end is not yet. Here we have discussion of socialism and citizenship in various aspects, marriage and divorce, civilization, imperialism, flying machines. The whole range of general interests is covered with the charming style and provoking ideas of one of the foremost essayists of this generation. For one who wants to study Mr. Wells and to dip with Mr. Wells into the varied interests of the day this is by all means the book to read.

W. O. CARVER.

The Great Society: A Psychological Analysis. By Graham Wallas, Author of "Human Nature in Politics," etc. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1914. 369 pp. \$2.00 net.

The Key to Mr. Wallas' discussion is in the following statement, found in the remarks introductory to Part II, of his book. "So far I have been examining facts of human psychology with the purpose of discovering how they can be adapted to the needs of the Great Society. Now I shall examine existing forms of organization in the Great Society with the purpose of discovering how far they can be improved by a closer adaptation to the facts of human psychology." By the phrase, "the Great Society," he means the vast population now linked together in the complex industrial and political organization of the modern state. Comparatively few people realize the vast enlargement of the scale of society, both as to the number of people brought into relations with one another and as to the complexity of

their relations. Out of this enlargement have grown many of our gravest problems. With these problems in their psychological aspects Mr. Wallas here deals; and his discussion is always interesting and nearly always illuminating.

In his Psychology he follows McDougall, for the most part, in his doctrine of the instincts and psycho-physical "dispositions." The point of the discussion is that human instincts and "dispositions" were organized under very different and very much simpler conditions of life than those under which civilized men now live. These instincts and dispositions are constitutional and hereditary; and in the midst of the changed conditions of life brought about by the vast extension of an artificial civilization they do not readily find their normal satisfaction. There is a serious lack of adaptation. Out of this situation grows much of the restlessness and vague discontent of modern life. Return to primitive conditions is impossible; and hence the necessity of a very extensive readjustment of the machinery of modern civilization.

The book, while it by no means exhausts this interesting and fruitful theme, is worthy of serious study by those who desire to get a comprehensive understanding of our present-day life. In some respects the author's positions are not, I think, tenable; but even those who disagree with him in some particulars will find the volume as a whole very helpful. I found especially interesting the chapters on "The Organization of Thought" and "The Organization of Happiness." Mr. Wallas, it seems, has had considerable political experience, and devotes considerable space to the consideration of the efficiency of the political machinery of modern States, especially of England and America.

C. S. GARDNER.

Feeble-Mindedness: Its Causes and Consequences. By Henry Herbert Goddard, Ph.D., Director of the Research Laboratory of the Training School, at Vineland, New Jersey, for Feeble-Minded Girls and Boys. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1914. 599 pp. \$4.00 net.

Dr. Goddard has given us a great array of carefully examined facts; and he does not leave us without suggestions as to the

meaning of the facts, though he has not over-burdened his book with theory. And it is all told in a most simple style and kindly spirit; for it is evident that the author has a great and tender heart.

The problem he discusses is one of large proportions. He tells us that there are between 300,000 and 400,000 feeble-minded persons in the United States. A great many of these are not recognized and treated as such. Mentally they are children, but physically they are men and women. Many of them are placed in positions of responsibility, and disaster usually results. Many of them do criminal acts for which they are really not mentally or morally responsible. They constitute a real danger. If they could be "colonized" and were properly treated they might, nearly all of them, become in an humble way useful members of society.

As to causes, Dr. Goddard tells us that of the 327 cases whose family histories he studied, 27 were thrown out because of insufficient data. Of the remaining 300 54% were certainly hereditary; 11.3% were probably hereditary; 12% had a "neuropathic ancestry;" 19% he classed as accidental and in the few remaining cases he discovered nothing to account for the conditions. From that he concludes that the great cause of feeble-mindedness is heredity. From this it is evident that this great menace to society can be averted only by preventing feeble-minded persons from becoming parents.

But I cannot undertake to indicate, however briefly, the interesting points of this book. It is well worth study. The comparatively high price is due to the large number of diagrams and illustrations.

C. S. GARDNER.

The Family and Society. By John M. Gillette, Ph.D., Professor of Sociology in the University of North Dakota; Author of "Vocational Education" and "Constructive Rural Sociology." Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1914. 155 pp. 50c.

This is one of a series of hand-books constituting the National Social Science Series edited by Dr. McVey of the University of North Dakota and published by McClurg.

A great deal is compressed within the narrow limits of this little volume. It contains a good review of the theories as to the origin and early forms of the family. Its discussion of the conditions affecting the family in modern life and of the biological phases of sex is valuable.

The Treasure. By Kathleen Norris, Author of "Mother," "The Rich Mrs. Burgoyne," "Poor Dear Margaret Kirby," etc., etc. Illustrated. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914. 186 pp. \$1.00 net.

Kathleen Norris' stories are simple in plot, beautiful in spirit, clean in speech and idea. This one is hardly more than a "short story" and has barely enough plot to carry it. It is a discussion of the servant problem of the modern woman and suggests a solution that deserves really serious consideration. Her advocacy (or is it satire?) of the modern woman is emphasized by having the daughter of the mother of the old school propose to the man of her choice and the plans of the young people are thoroughly modern and include the modern idea of the servant problem. It is an interesting, not a great, book.

3. PEDAGOGICAL.

Religion and Temperament. A Popular Study of Their Relations, Actual and Possible. By Rev. J. S. Stevenson, B.A. Funk & Wagnalls Co., New York and London. 323 pp. \$1.50.

The ten chapters of which this volume consists draw their material from science, psychology, theology and especially from biography. The author has a readable and vigorous style which is often incisive and graphic and never dull and heavy. He has made a valuable contribution to the psychology of religious experience from the viewpoint of temperament.

It is argued that every man is potentially religious irrespective of his temperament which, however, may assist or hinder one's progress in sainthood.

Spiritual capacity is "seemingly the only human gift that is not shared in some rudimentary degree with the lower animals. It is essential to man that he should be human. It is essential to the human that he be potentially religious."

Heredity may give a bias toward religion but does not thereby determine destiny. God gives to every one the possibility of religious development but not a compulsion toward the divine, for spiritual experience is a matter of persuasion and not of coercion. It is false to assert that an anti-religious bias is a necessary part of the equipment of a true scientist, who ought reverently to read God's book of nature.

In the chapter on "Religion and Christianity" the author shows that Christianity has an efficiency not discoverable in any other religion.

To present Jesus Christ as the peerless one and redemption through Him as the supreme hope of the world is the Christian's duty and delight. Christianity stands for the highest development of personality and therefore has the strongest claims not only on the affections of the humble believer but also on the faith of the exponent of evolutionary ideals.

The function of the will in religious experience is to transform a temperament into a character. Temperament is the nucleus of character which is rightly formed through the co-operation of the human and the divine.

The following quotation is of special interest to all students of psychology and theology: "All men are *in esse*, and even more *in posse*, children of God. We all have spiritual life; and unless this were so the new birth would be impossible. Birth is not the beginning of life." It is well to remember that the Spirit giveth life and all must be born from above. Is Christian experience a mere development?

The author provides for complete and radical spiritual renovation of those who have gone far into sin. "Conversion is of two kinds—conversion by evolution and conversion by revolution." The child in a Christian home is converted by evolution while the man of the slums is converted by revolution. The salvation of both child and debauche is, however, of the Lord and through personal faith in Jesus Christ.

Character is the result of temperamental capacity developed by choice. Heredity and environment are not sufficient to ac-

count for human development. Heredity is tendency, not destiny, and environment is potent but mutable. We can modify our environment and change our position.

The author contends for the freedom of the will within limits. Man feels that he is free; he has a sense of responsibility evinced in human law and social life; he has feeling of choice in regard to moral alternatives, and is capable of gratitude, guilt and remorse. The human will and divine power make character out of temperament. A brief historical survey of temperaments is given; their physical basis indicated; their characteristics described; and their possibilities suggested.

To the four generally accepted temperaments—the phlegmatic, the sanguine, the choleric and the melancholy—the author adds the practical and the artistic, and closes the discussion with a chapter on “The Temperament of Jesus.” The phlegmatic are non-obtrusive and slow to take the initiative. “They rarely come out of the garage under their own power. But once they really take the road they may be depended on for a lengthy run.” They economize their emotions and use them in successful plodding. They are fair company of the restful type and excellent friends of staying quality. They are generally cautious, persevering and reliable. Herbert Spencer, and Prince Albert who married Queen Victoria, are presented as celebrated examples of the phlegmatic. The temperamental slowness of the phlegmatic tends to undue procrastination and incapacitates for brilliant initiative. The greatest need of the phlegmatic is the changing of the strength of inertia into the strength of expression. Religiously they are moved more by reason than by feeling; they are usually faithful in stormy weather and between revivals.

The sanguine put new life into others. They are popular in the social circle and successful in religious work. They have a talent for putting their best to the fore, their shop windows make a fine display even when the internal supply is nearly exhausted. They make the best of the worst; they are heroes of forlorn hopes. Yet their emotional center may change too readily. They sometimes carry out a programme of self-indulg-

ence; they would rather feel good than to be good or do good. They are often capable of gigantic feats which they heroically undertake and unless a reaction comes, they gloriously achieve. Columbus, Cardinal Newman and John Wesley are given as striking examples of the sanguine.

The choleric are volcanic; they are the sons of thunder. They make enthusiastic friends and bitter enemies. They are irascible and capable of a deep and abiding indignation. The choleric need an unusual measure of divine grace to enable them to conquer their volatile tempers; but when the victory is gained they become examples of patience. Moses, the Earl of Shaftesbury and others are given to illustrate the choleric Temperament.

The melancholy temperament is preëminently, the temperament of the prophets. "In the melancholy there is a basal seriousness that compels contact with deeper phases of life and assists appreciation of the fundamental spiritualities." They can not rest in the superficial; they probe the heart of reality and belong to the true nobility of mankind. They make the practical mystic, the man with a purpose and a holy mission. Cromwell and Bunyan are striking examples of the melancholy, who though serious are often joyous.

The passion for efficiency is the key-note of the practical temperament; while the artistic temperament is shown in a talent for the appreciation of the beautiful in form, color and character.

All temperaments have their perfect development and embodiment in Jesus Christ, the ideal man.

BYRON H. DEMENT.

The Primacy of Personality in Pedagogy. By John W. Jent, Th.D., Lancaster, Texas. 1914.

This pamphlet of nearly one hundred pages is a thesis submitted to the faculty of the graduate school of Yale University in candidacy for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Education.

The treatment is a combination of the historical, the psychological and the practical. The author traces the evolution of in-

dividualism from primitive society to Christian civilization, and gives the progress of pedagogy from the earliest education to the most modern eclecticism. The chapters on the Nature of Personality and the Pedagogics of Personality are strong and discriminating. The closing chapter deals with educational ideals and practical methods for their realization. The booklet will be of value to those who are willing to think.

The Training of Sunday School Teachers and Officers. By Franklin McElfresh, Secretary of the Committee of Education, International Sunday School Association. New York: Eaton & Mains. 230 pp.

In this timely volume Dr. McElfresh discusses practically every phase of the training of Sunday school teachers and officers. He points out the new demands, aims and methods of training for efficiency in religious work. Training in local Sunday schools, the city institutes and in the religious colleges is suggestively treated. The best courses of study for the teachers of different grades and sexes are clearly outlined. Valuable suggestions are made at the close of each chapter and a good bibliography is given in the appendix.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE.

The Modern Church. By Philip A. Nordell, D.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914. 333 pp. 75c.

This volume consists of fifty-two chapters admirably adapted for class work during one full year of weekly meetings.

Vital subjects are discussed in a suggestive manner. The author is quite felicitous in the selection of a topic and scripture reading with which he begins each chapter. For instance, Lesson 36, The Religious Press, Scripture Reading: A Bringer of Good Tidings, Isa. 52:7-10.

Each chapter closes with additional reading references, review questions, questions on the lesson with space for written answers, subjects for special study and note-book work, and questions for class discussion.

The modern Sunday school is considered in six chapters—its history, gradation and efficiency. The place of the modern pulpit

and public worship is exalted and defended; church attendance is discussed and modern evangelism described. Young peoples' societies, the boy problem, woman's work, the federation of churches, industrial problems, civic questions, the family, the state, the public school, immigration, and the various types of churches—country, city, frontier, and mining—are discussed in an illuminating and stimulating fashion.

Dr. Nordell advocates a redemptive application of the Gospel to modern man in every relation of our complex civilization. The modern church must embody and deliver a message efficient for the life that now is as well as for the life that is to come.

B. H. DEMENT.

The City Church and Its Social Mission: A Series of Studies in the Social Extension of the City Church. By A. M. Trawick, Secretary Student Department, International Committee Young Men's Christian Association. New York: Association Press, 1913. 160 pp.

Dr. Trawick is a careful investigator and thinker; a clear and thoughtful writer; a Christian of deep piety and strong convictions; and withal a most attractive personality. These qualities all show themselves in this volume with which he has enriched the literature of Christian Sociology. He considers such important themes as Family Life, the Public Care of Children, the Problem of Charity, the Labor Problem, Social Vice, and Other Religious Agencies, and endeavors to point out the relation which the city church should sustain to these practical problems. It is a practical question of very great importance to city churches and pastors, and Dr. Trawick will, we think, help them if they will read what he has to say. His suggestions are not radical, nor "wild," but practical. As indicative of the conservative spirit of the author, consider these sentences: "A changed heart with a life that corresponds to it is the secret from which all beneficent activity springs. Nothing that human ingenuity can devise will ever be a substitute for the simple Bible imperative 'Ye must be born again.' In nothing can the city church perform a service of more preëminent value than in the increasing proclamation of this spiritual necessity in the lives

of its members who toil or who employ others to toil." The constructive programme for social effort which he outlines for the city church always rests on this foundation. But he insists that the church shall constantly endeavor to stimulate its members to take interest in the social problems that lie right at its door and to find in the solution of those problems the proper field for the application of the Christian principles they have been taught. The book is an excellent and helpful one.

C. S. GARDNER.

The Offices of Baptism and Confirmation. By T. Thompson, M.A., of Saint Anselm's House, Cambridge. Cambridge: At the University Press (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York), 1914. x+253 pp. 6 shillings, net.

This is a volume in "The Cambridge Handbooks of Liturgical Study," edited by Drs. H. B. Swete and J. H. Srawley; the purpose of which is "to offer to students who are entering upon the study of Liturgies such help as may enable them to proceed with advantage to the use of the larger and more technical works upon the subject * * *." The immediate aim of the author is "to furnish an account of the liturgical history of baptism and confirmation." He has done his work with great care and with an abundant use of the materials for such work. He has given general views of the rites under discussion and clear accounts of specialized usage in the various geographical and ecclesiastical divisions of the Christian organizations. The work is generally marked by objective scholarship although one regrets that this statement cannot fairly apply to his treatment of the New Testament and the first period of Christianity. If he were not dealing with a serious matter where above all things unbiased frankness ought to characterize the student, the author's indefinite and evasive handling of the New Testament evidence in reference to his subjects would be very amusing. It is to his credit that finding that "what was the practice of the Apostolic period cannot now be determined" in the matter of the age of baptism the author finds it "better, therefore, to proceed to the later practice" which alone included such things as he is dealing with.

This reviewer may frankly say that the whole liturgical business has for him only a curious interest. The picture of the discussions among Cyprian and others of the proper administrator of the rites and specifically of how to deal with heretical baptisms and confirmations he would especially recommend to such Baptists as find so engaging the fine points in connection with "alien" baptisms in these days.

Our author is going a little far in his use of language when he gives to "immersion" a special meaning (Ch. IV. of Part II) and adopts the term "submersion" for what is universally known as *immersion*. His argument against the practice of immersion in early times is one of which any scholar ought to be heartily ashamed.

It is no inspiring story our author has told of the practices of Christians in their liturgical rites but the story is well presented for an introductory handbook and the work should be widely used.

W. O. CARVER.

The Witness of History to Baptist Principles. By W. T. Whitley, M.A., LL.D., F.R.Hist.S. Revised Edition. London: The Kingsgate Press, 1914. 25c.

With scholarly ability Dr. Whitley has here done a fine work. He recognizes that his method is supplemental to that of President Mullins in his "Axioms of Religion." These two works, the one from the standpoint of Scripture and reason and the other from the standpoint of history, constitute a presentation of the Baptist position that is worthy of all consideration.

The Diary of a Minister's Wife. By Anna E. S. Droke; Illustrated by George Avison. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. 259 pp. \$1.25 net.

Without any marked literary merit this diary of the wife of a Methodist minister has in it practical wisdom, humor, pathos, all in engaging verisimilitude. The various experiences are related, from the courtship on through trying pastorates with crosses and successes up to "the First Church in X—, the

largest and most important church in the Conference." The experiences are official, family and personal. It is good, wholesome reading for all classes.

III.—BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research. By A. T. Robertson, M.A., D.D., LL.D., Professor of Interpretation of the New Testament in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. Hodder & Stoughton; New York, George H. Doran Company, 1914. xl+1360 pp. \$5.00 net.

To speak in the measured terms of the moderation and reserve of scientific scholarship is not easy for one who for fifteen years has watched the growth of a work that has taken much of the author's time and energy through a full quarter of a century. I have read every word of it except in the indices. Nearly all of it I have worked through with such critical care as my limited equipment made possible. I have had unusual opportunity, therefore, to know the book. My love for the author and my admiration for his remarkable work have not blinded my eyes for defects, but in the face of the surpassing magnitude of so great an achievement and of such great excellencies minor matters are not to be mentioned. It is difficult to know where to begin to speak of so unusual a production within the limits of a review. Let me describe its make-up. The *preface* of eight pages is a strikingly frank personal declaration. The "Table of Contents" sets forth simply the three "Parts," *Introduction*, *Accidence*, *Syntax*, with the chapter headings, twenty-two in all, and indicates the indices. A "List of Works most often Referred to" occupies twenty-one pages, while it is explained that an exhaustive analytic bibliography which had been prepared had to be omitted. The body of the work occupies twelve hundred and eight pages, with a dozen more pages of "additional notes" occupied mainly with a "list of important verbs" including none that is "purely normal." An English "Index of Subjects" an "Index of Greek Words", each calls for twenty-six pages; and all index pages are in double column. The "Index

of Quotations," eighty-six pages, gives a suggestion of the comprehensive character, exhaustive completeness and inestimable usefulness of the work. Naturally the great bulk of quotation references are to the New Testament, seventy pages. They include nearly all the verses of the New Testament and indicate how thoroughly the grammatical facts of these writings have been covered. Not only are more than four-fifths of all verses of the New Testament treated in some way but very many receive multiple treatment, for various items, rising even to the number of nineteen references (to Acts 17:27). The most valuable of all commentaries on the Scriptures are the grammatical commentaries and while direct Scripture exposition cannot be the immediate aim of a grammarian inevitably he is telling the meaning of Scripture at every point and giving the reason for this interpretation. And so it comes about that this Grammar, covering with such thoroughness all vital points of etymology and syntax in the entire New Testament, must prove itself for the willing student the very best of commentaries on the New Testament. It will be the necessity and the joy of the commentator. But it will equally be the companion and instructor of that class of preachers, happily growing in numbers, whose chief source of help in sermon making is their Greek Testament. This Grammar is no mere dry treatise for the limited circle of learned professors and investigators. The enthusiasm of the author for the Word of the Lord, while not allowed to jostle his critical judgment nor to limit the intensity of his laborious research, has nevertheless inspired every page. He has seen all along, as the bright motive of almost endless toil, the illumining of the supreme message of God for humanity. All students with a good working knowledge of Greek will be able to use this Grammar as an unfailing source in interpreting the New Testament messages.

The Old Testament has, of course, contributed a distinct grammatical influence to the language of the New. Much patient, critical study of the Septuagint has in recent times yielded valuable returns in learned works, all of which Dr. Robertson has used constantly, and his *Index* includes four pages of ref-

erences to Old Testament passages, with an additional page of references to the Old Testament Apocrypha and several to the "Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs."

What more than anything else has made necessary and profitable a reworking of the New Testament by the grammarian is the discovery in the last two generations, mainly within one generation, of innumerable examples of the common Greek speech, literary and vernacular, of the time and shortly before, and succeeding the time, of the New Testament writings. In his Introduction Professor Robertson has given a good account of all this with discussion of its bearing on our understanding of the writers of the New Testament, and throughout his work has made full use of these discoveries, as represented in copies of the inscriptions, papyri and ostraca themselves in considerable measure, and as represented in the works of the great scholars, in all languages, who have devoted themselves to their collection, classification and interpretation. Six pages give references to these sources of information used in the body of the work. Other Greek literature, from classical to modern times is used so extensively that four pages are needed for these references.

I have felt that in no other way could I so quickly give my reader some suggestion of the inexhaustible stores of helpful learning offered in this volume, a volume that at once takes rank among the most extensive and most important single productions in this or any other land or time. Dr. Robertson's "Short Grammar," translated into French, Italian, Dutch and German and running in its third American edition and with a special edition in England, had been produced to meet the necessities of New Testament study while the great work was preparing. It had revealed Dr. Robertson's method and capacity but in no way supplied the demand for the complete work. Both will still be needed. The Short Grammar will be used for class room work with students in the earlier stages of New Testament study, while for advanced students and for all technical work the new book will be in demand.

All who are at all competent to judge will congratulate Dr. Robertson on the completion of so great a task after a full quar-

ter of a century of labor, not chiefly because in it a great ambition is realized but because in it the world of New Testament scholarship has a treasury of most useful knowledge in usable form.

A word must be added about the price of the book. It sells for five dollars and the buyer pays carriage charges. The cost of the first edition would indicate a price of not less than twelve and a half dollars a volume. As books are usually sold it would be even more than that. Such a price would greatly have reduced the usefulness of the book by limiting its sale. The present price is made possible by a plan of endowment which is partly explained in the *preface* of the book. What will not appear to all in that explanation is that the conditions of this endowment, and the price of the book, leave no expectation that the author will himself ever profit a penny by the sale of this which a German friend so well styles his *opus magnum, Jupiter, et laboriosum*. For Dr. Robertson it is a labor of love and a contribution to Christian learning. Well may we expect it to prove a monument of enduring honor.

W. O. CARVER.

The Historical Christ; or An Investigation of the Views of Mr. J. M. Robertson, Dr. A. Drews, and Prof. W. B. Smith. By Fred C. Conybeare, F.B.A. The Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, Ill., 1914. 235 pp.

Mr. Conybeare is one of the leading rationalists in England. He is a scholar of real ability, though a thorough-going sceptic. He rejects all the Gospels tell about the words and works of Jesus as mere legends, but he at least believes that Jesus lived. He feels called upon to expose the fallacies of the small group of men who have made a deal of noise on the notion that Jesus never lived at all, but is a mere myth, a Persian sun-god. He is merciless in his riddling of the follies and inconsistencies of Drews of Germany, Robertson of England, and Smith of America. One can see also that it will not be hard to turn upon Conybeare and show how his admissions about Jesus call for more, but he is apparently set in his rationalism.

A. T. ROBERTSON.

Jesus and His Parables. By George Murray, B.D. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1914. 305 pp.

Mr. Murray writes with freshness and insight about the Parables of Jesus. The field has been often gone over before, but he has his own method of study and it is fruitful. There is an introduction on the whole subject that is helpful and stimulating. Then he groups the Parables under five divisions: I. Grace in the Individual Life. II. Pharisaism the Foe. III. Fellowship with God the Ideal. IV. The Course of the Kingdom. V. Discipline and Judgment. Some of the Parables are thus taken out of their context, but he is true in the main to the point of the Master.

A. T. ROBERTSON.

A Letter to Asia: Being a Paraphrase and Brief Exposition of the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Believers at Colossae. By Frederick Brooke Westcott, D.D., Archdeacon of Norwich. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1914. 203 pp. \$1.00 net.

Mr. Westcott is a son of the famous Bishop B. F. Westcott and it is natural to see him in grammatical exposition. His previous volume, *St. Paul and Justification*, is a fine piece of fresh study of a most familiar theme. There is here the same independent and vigorous discussion that makes the book have a charm for the reader. The volume is not designed for experts, but for those with only a slight knowledge of Greek. However, there is something of interest for the advanced students for the author has a sharp eye for the newest things, as, for instance, the discovery of the use of *βαρεῖον* (cf Col. 2:18) in an inscription. I believe that the new discoveries in the papyri and the inscriptions will add much to the resources of the exposition. Mr. Westcott expects to continue his expository studies.

A. T. ROBERTSON.

The Gospel According to St. Luke: The Greek Text, Edited with Introduction and Notes for the Use of Schools. By W. F. Burnside, M.A., Headmaster of St. Edmund's School, Canterbury, Author of *Old Testament History for Schools*. Cambridge, at the University Press, 1913 (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York). xxxvi+272 pp. \$1.00 net.

The Greek text is that of Wesacott and Hort with critical annotations omitted. The expository and grammatical notes are mainly edited from Plummer. The splendid and useful marginal analysis with references to the other Gospels is from Wright's Luke. The good summary "Introduction" touches briefly but with firmness the main questions, taking the conservative view of modern research. An outline of the period "between the Testaments" is included.

In paper, type and binding nothing has been neglected to make this one of the most convenient and every way desirable editions of Luke imaginable.

The Child's Bible; A Selection of Bible Stories in the Words of the Authorized Version; with four full-page color plates. Funk & Wagnalls Company. New York and London. vii+247 pp.

As indicated in the sub-title this selection includes only stories. With varying fullness it has the chief stories from both Testaments, eighty-one from the Old and fifty-nine from the New. Where abridgement is employed there is usually no indication of it in the text. Connecting material supplied by the editor is bracketed. The selection and editing have been as well done as the limits of the work would well permit. It is a convenient volume well adapted to its purpose.

IV. THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL.

The Message of New Thought. By Abel Leighton Allen. New York, 1914, Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 290 pp. \$1.25 net.

This work professes to answer the three questions: What is New Thought? How does New Thought differ from Orthodox Christianity? "What is the line of divergence between New Thought and Christian Science?" That were a good service. It is rendered with enthusiasm by the author and in very readable style. It is not possible to credit him with great success in answering any one of the questions, however. "New Thought" is cultivated in an esoteric cult and Mr. Allen is far less satis-

factory in expounding it than Trine or Patterson. His eagerness to antagonize "orthodox Christian creeds," about which his information is far from accurate and his attitude far from judicial, unites with his enthusiasm for his own creed, which he conceives with characteristic vagueness, to make him an advocate who impresses you with his self-sufficient faith and polemical disdain rather than with any helpful spirit of instruction. He touches but slightly on Christian Science but touches exactly at the point of divergence between the two cults, his own idealistic realism and the idealistic nihilism of Christian Science.

The work is engaging and on many accounts interesting reading. Its optimism, resting wholly on human individualism, is not well founded and ignores the terrible facts of human tragedy and denies sin outright. It is frankly pantheistic. "Some one has said," so we read, "'God sleeps in the rock, smiles in the flower, and comes to consciousness in man.' This unity of life, this divine intelligence, pervading all nature and rising to its highest expression in man, is the basic fact in the philosophy of New Thought." In ethics the author makes personal happiness the goal and so the motive of all morals. One can hardly escape the impression all along that the author's New Thought is constructed of certain aspects of Christianity so separated from their logical and practical connections as to render them unchristian. There is all the way a dependence on Christianity, manifesting its consciousness by opposing what the author calls Christian beliefs but which are usually perversions of Christian teaching. The system does not seem to be sufficiently comprehensive and coherent to stand alone and so must lean upon Christianity. And this is true of the system quite apart from its rather inadequate presentation in Mr. Allen's interesting volume.

W. O. CARVER.

Christianity Old and New; Lectures Given at Berkeley, Cal., on the E. T. Earl Foundation. By Benjamin W. Bacon, Professor of New Testament Criticism and Interpretation in Yale University. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1914. xiv+169 pp. \$1.00 net.

This little volume by the distinguished leader in America of a certain critical school is at once one of the most interesting and vitally constructive of recent works in critical Apologetic. Beyond question the author's judgments in matters of detail are sometimes enslaved to his presuppositions, as whose is not, alas? And his critical views of the New Testament literature are more radical than the best recognized scholarship of the day require or even strongly favor. He leans too heavily upon Bousset. But the literary critical element in this work is secondary. Its main purpose is to inquire whether Christianity has such basis in fact, such content in ideal, such impulse in experience as to make it ultimate and so the religion of the future. It is notable for its approach *via* the mystery religions and its deft handling of this complicated subject.

"Historically, religions may be classified according to the preponderance of the self-regarding or the altruistic impulse." Both these elements are present in Christianity from the start and two tendencies are found, often in conflict, designated as "Ethical" and "Mystical." The nineteenth century was dominated by liberalism, the twentieth by mythical idealism. So now we seek to emphasize the ideal, the mystical, and tend to ignore the historical, the concrete actual. Professor Bacon has made a quite fresh and rationally invincible argument for the historicity of Jesus and of the "gospel of Jesus" as the necessary basis of "the gospel *about* Jesus."

While I do not fully accept his premises and would have to dissent from much of his critical opinion about the structure and date of the New Testament literature I greatly appreciate his argument and rejoice to find him proceeding from the very central positions of current criticism by an open road to a genuine faith in the Redeemer who by His suffering saves many. "Is this historic Jesus, dimly and yet truly and surely seen through the transfiguring haze of love and adoration, a true Redeemer of the world? That question will be answered as we answer one more practical and real: Is his doctrine of the Kingdom ultimate as a social, his doctrine of sonship ultimate as an individual, ideal? If so, their representative is one in

whom loyalty can never meet disappointment. Their representative is 'Christ Jesus, who before Pontius Pilate witnessed the good confession.' " This conclusion and the whole treatment of his subject mark Professor Bacon as more evangelical in his theology than in his criticism; but he has remarkably well connected his theology and his criticism. Would he ever have reached this theology through his criticism? Is he not one among many examples of men who in spite of their radical criticism hold and defend a theology based on an experience ante-dating their criticism?

W. O. CARVER.

The Interregnum. By R. A. P. Hill, B.A., M.D. Cambridge: At the University Press (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York), 1913. xv+149 pp. \$1.45 net.

The "Interregnum" is the author's term for the period of philosophical and religious anarchy which so frequently intervenes between the traditional faith of childhood and the personal theories of mature thought. There ought to be no such interregnum. It is ground for one of the most severe complaints against educational methods, in the home and in the schools, that no provision is made for the soul to pass normally into its independence. Why should a fall off the height of childish confidence be permitted into an abyss of doubt from which the youth climbs again only by painful effort, if at all, onto a new base of security? There is a gap there but its crossing can be made safely if only the teachers were wise instead of being smart, if they were not careless where they should be most eager to be helpful.

Our author does not treat of this, however. He assumes the interregnum and has in this work undertaken to point the way to restored confidence by building up a practical presumption for faith's essentials. His method is that of logic based on natural religion. It is much the method of Butler and more reminds of the Analogy than anything else one has read in many a long day. The processes are good and the work well done albeit a little tedious just because, only because, so much out of the way of current thought.

The reviewer heard Canon Scott Holland seven years ago predict the return of Butler's Analogy to its former place in the curricula of apologetic study in schools and in reading. He could see no sufficient ground for the Canon's expectation. This little book is a beginning in that way. The author adopts his own definitions for terms already in common use and the reader must be careful to keep in mind the author's vocabulary or he will fail to understand him. Part I deals with faith and beliefs as the soul's fundamental attitude and presupposition. Part II treats of opinion as "logical conclusion from evidence," and of the convictions and conduct that follow.

The work is a fine argument for trying Christianity rather than for its truth, if one may make the distinction. For very many it would be most useful.

W. O. CARVER.

The Enlarging Conception of God. By H. A. Youtz. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1914. 199 pp. \$1.25 net.

There is no special appropriateness in the title of this discussion. Very little is said of the "enlarging conception of God" in any direct way until the last chapter. The book is rather a restatement in a form which has become very familiar of the modern point of view and the modern "demands" upon theology.

We must derive our conception of God from contemporary thought not from any fixed form or revelation in the past. The fundamental difference between traditional and modern theological method consists in the departure from the old view of "static truth" and the recognition of the evolutionary view that no theology can be fixed in final forms. All language, all laws of thought, and all psychology bear witness to the truth of the evolutionary view. The outcome is that we must no longer bow to the authority of the creeds, the Bible, or to Christ, save that in the case of Christ, while He remains "spiritually supreme" for mankind, His method is personal and "dynamic" rather than external and authoritative.

The author decries a "safe theology" because it takes away responsibility for thought, struggle, and moral achievement.

Jesus is the revealer of God. He is "very God of very God" only in the sense that God dwelt in Him, and that thus He reveals God to us. He does not in Himself rise above the human level. But then God may be known in human terms and only thus. There is no conflict, no separation between the divine and human which forbids this kind of a revelation of God in Christ.

The strong points in this plea are the demand for reality in religion; the value of vital and living experience; the repudiation of merely rationalistic thought and mechanical authorities; the acceptance of personality as the clew to the meaning of the world; the repudiation of the mechanical explanation of the world, and the recognition of the guidance of the spirit of God.

One weak point in the book is its overweening confidence in the current conceptions of scientific thought for the explanation of religion. The author inveighs against rationalism but makes a fundamental demand that religion be harmonized with the modern reason. He rejects the idea that the old theistic proofs are sufficient because they are too conclusive. They prove too much. Then he proceeds to give us a rounded view which does no violence to reason and proves everything. There is no uncertainty anywhere in his statements, no sense of the insufficiency of his own reason, but a remarkable sense of the insufficiency of those who start from another point of view and seek the same values in the interest of religion primarily rather than those of modern thought. He does not seem to recognize that a God who reveals himself in the experience of the simply human Jesus involves for the thoughtful the difficulty that such revelation of God can scarcely be final. He holds the self-contradictory view that we can rise to God through the human Jesus but that Jesus could not have been a revelation of God in any higher sense. We can only know God adequately through forms of human experience. Hence, he concludes, we know God adequately in the experience of Christ. The author glides over Paul and John and the New Testament interpretation of Christ, simply because his fundamental assumption is that everything must go which conflicts with the modern view. Nowhere does he face the great questions of the nature of religion, the need of revela-

tion, the need of redemption. His theory is beautifully simple. It leaves no difficulties. The view is not novel. Scores of books are issuing from the press advocating it in substantially the same form. Meantime humanity and those scholars who are interested in religion for its own sake are solving the problem in a far deeper and more successful way, and without any clash with anything legitimate in modern thought.

E. Y. MULLINS.

Die Prinzipien der deutschen reformierten Dogmatik im Zeitalter der aristotelischen Scholastik. Von Lic. Paul Althaus. Leipsic, 1914. A. Deichertsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Werner Scholl. M. 7.50.

The writer gives us here a valuable review of the fundamental principles of the reformed dogmatics under the influence of the Aristotelian logic. Out of the simple emotional and unphilosophic theology of the reformation era itself there inevitably arose the tendency to rationalize all doctrines into elaborate systems. We have in this volume a very suggestive and valuable historical survey of the movement. The first section discusses the relation between philosophy and theology; the second the relation between reason and revelation; the third the doctrine of religious certainty. Perhaps for the modern reader the third section will have the greatest vital interest. It deals with questions which in their modified forms are burning questions of today. Certainty regarding salvation, and certainty regarding the Scriptures are the two branches of the general teaching. The author concludes that there was a decline in the vital elements of theology when the rationalizing tendency became dominant, but recognizes the inevitableness of the movement, which was simply thought grappling with the deeper problems of religion.

E. Y. MULLINS.

The Son of Man; Studies in the Gospel of Mark. By A. C. Zenos. Charles Scribner's Sons. New York, 1914. 137 pp. 60c net.

Jesus as the Son of Man was foreshadowed in the Old Testament as the King of goodwill, with the higher human qualities, as contrasted with the brute force of ancient kingdoms.

Jesus as Son of Man recognized and condemned sin, and by his death removed it as a barrier between God and man. He taught that institutions are for the service of man and that their value is to be appraised on this principle. He did not need redemption, hence His redemptive ministry could take the form of a ransom for others. This was the culmination of His redemptive activity.

As Son of Man it was necessary that He suffer death. This was the expression of His will of complete dedication to the redemptive end of His mission. He triumphed in the resurrection. His second coming may be conceived in various forms. But it means the increasing nearness, reality, and power of Christ. The discussion is brief but illuminating and helpful in a practical way to the earnest reader. It necessarily raises questions which cannot be answered within the given limits. We commend it as a devout and scholarly epitome of its great theme.

E. Y. MULLINS.

Christianity and Ethics: A Handbook of Christian Ethics. By Archibald B. D. Alexander, M.A., D.D., Author of "A Short History of Philosophy," "The Ethics of St. Paul," etc. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914. xii+257 pp. 75c. net.

Postulates, Personality, Character, Conduct: these four general topics under which Dr. Alexander's discussion is arranged show at once a comprehensive and correct grasp of his subject and invite to the splendidly organized details of discussion. The complete analysis is the chief merit of the work. His view of the subject is so exhaustive that under the space limits of the "Studies in Theology" series for which he was writing he was able only to give suggestive or very condensed expression to his views. Yet the work is one of the best possible as a basis for a thorough study of "the Christian conception of the moral life" in all its departments and applications. The author has employed in good balance logical and psychological method, historical and exegetical. Its condensation is its greatest fault, and that may be regarded a virtue—certainly for many it is.

W. O. CARVER.

Death and the Life Beyond in the Light of Modern Religious Thought. By Rev. Frederic C. Spurr, Author of "Christ and Caesar," "Jesus Christ To-day: The Exiled God," etc., Minister of First Baptist Church, Melbourne, Australia. Hodder & Stoughton, New York and London (George H. Doran Company), 1914. viii+159 pp. \$1.00 net.

With eloquent words and, for the most part, clear and cogent reasoning the author presents various phases of the modern argument for the continued life of the soul beyond this age. Thus three chapters. Chapter IV discusses the term "eternal" and interprets it qualitatively as against quantitatively. It is a term of description and not of measure. The author takes literally the term "age" and holds that the revelation of the Bible has to do only with "this age" and the next "coming age" and leaves all beyond that untouched. Men begin in the next age with the character in all respects with which they quit this age. Two chapters deal with the conditions of men in the coming life in "heaven" and in "hell." Here the views are quite modern but still evangelical. The rejection of literalism as to "hell" is ably defended but one is unable to approve the method by which the author interprets Scriptures to sustain the claim that science, ethics and Scripture teach that 'the chastisement' of the 'hell' experience will for 'the many' prove effective in their reclamation. It is going very far to hold that the Scriptures do not refute any such notion. Certainly the author is misapplying his passages employed to make out a positive claim to this end in the Bible itself. There is loose thinking and bad exegesis at this point.

W. O. CARVER.

A Pilgrim of the Infinite. By William Valentine Kelley. The Methodist Book Concern, New York and Cincinnati, 1914. 84 pp. 50c net.

Whoever has sat for an hour under the spell of a chautauqua orator who gave free rein to a leaping imagination in ranging through a great subject and has wished that he might see in cold type the words of the eloquent address that so thrilled him will want this book.

It has a noble theme and right nobly treats it. From science and logic, from poet and sage the writer has drawn his appeals to hope and reason to call heart and will on into the way of the life endless, and limitless.

Mind and Spirit: A Study in Psychology. By Thomas Kirby Davis, D.D. Boston: Sherman, French & Company, 1914. 120 pp. \$1.00 net.

The author is in his eighty-ninth year and has been "used in preaching 'the glorious gospel of the blessed God' for nearly sixty-five years." He is vigorous, buoyant optimistic. The work presents his views not alone on New Testament psychology but on the general trend of Christian theology, criticism and practical work. He was a graduate of Yale and Princeton and the voice of the past speaks through him. There is in the work nothing new or great; but one finds it most interesting because of the personal element wherein is revealed the fine spirit of a good and loyal servant of Christ who cannot be idle in the vigor of a great age.

V. MISCELLANEOUS.

The Last Frontier; The White Man's War for Civilization in Africa. By E. Alexander Powell, F.R.G.S., Late of the American Consular Service in Egypt; with sixteen full-page illustrations and map. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914. xii+291 pp. \$1.50 net.

Egypt in Transition. By Sidney Low, with an Introduction by the Earl of Cromer, G.C.B., etc., with portraits. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914. xxi+316 pp. \$2.50 net.

The "last frontier" being Africa, as yet pretty much the whole of it, and Egypt being England's supreme problem and pressing interest in Africa, we may think of these two books together, and we shall need them both. The "Last Frontier" after two years is now out in a new edition at the reduced price. It is worth far more. Its scope is general, its descriptions graphic and vivid, its economic, political and administrative criticisms free and impartial. Its general spirit is genial and its outlook optimistic. It is a good book by means of which to range over Africa with a serious purpose and a hopeful spirit. Its literary style is racy, almost impressionistic, flowing and easy.

Mr. Low comes to us with an introduction by Earl Cromer, a real introduction and not a mere complimentary little note wormed out of a great man for advertising purposes. The Earl has commended the work and his approval would disarm fault-finding by any critic. Readers generally will appreciate the information, the interpretations, the descriptions in which the book abounds and which give fine insight into the problems which the British meet and are solving in effecting the transition of Egypt into civilization. This view of British ideals and methods can be compared with her own work in other parts of Africa and with that of other colonizing European governments in Mr. Powell's book where the approval falls very distinctly and enthusiastically with the French.

Mr. Low has a style as charming as Mr. Powell's and somewhat more classic. Both books are of superior interest and value.

W. O. CARVER.

Mexico and the United States: A Story of Revolution, Intervention and War. By Frederick Starr, of the University of Chicago. Illustrated with photographs and maps. Chicago, 1914. The Bible House. 450 pp.

Mexico, the Wonderland of the South. By W. E. Carson. Revised Edition with new chapters. New York, 1914. The Macmillan Company. xlii+449 pp. \$2.25 net.

Here are two attractive and informing books about Mexico, but for the sudden bursting forth of the great war in Europe the most engaging topic of the hour for Americans. Mr. Carson's book is in the best style of the newspaper correspondent, knowing how to make live copy but capable and conscientious with facts. His work of five years ago is brought down to the beginning of this year and is extensively illustrated from excellent photographs. There is enough of historical outline for the general reader.

Starr's book is impressionistic, friendly to Mexico and the Mexicans, vivacious. There is moralizing and character sketching a plenty. In it all there is oracular cocksureness, as any one familiar with the author's way would expect. Illustrations are

numerous and include charts, personal photographs, views and scenes, some very striking cartoons, etc. The work deals only with modern history and mainly with very recent history. "It is particularly to the period from the time when the Diaz power tottered that this book is devoted. It is its purpose to show why Diaz failed; why Francisco I. Madero succeeded in revolution and failed miserably in government; why there have been seven or eight revolutions since 1910; why Mexico hates us; why Huerta is (was) in power; and why we should refrain from meddling in the internal affairs of Mexico."

Many will be wanting books on Mexico. Here are two good ones.

W. O. CARVER.

Griechische Grammatik: Lautlehre, Stammbildungs und Flexionslehre, Syntax. Von Dr. Karl Brugmann, ord. Professor der indog. sprachw. in Leipzig. Vierte, vermehrte Auflage bearbeitet von Dr. Albert Thumb, ord. Professor der indog. sprachw. in Strassburg. C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, München, 1913. 772 pp. M 14.50; bound 16.50.

For many years Brugmann's *Griechische Grammatik* has been the standard discussion of Greek Grammar in the light of comparative philology. Brugmann asked Thumb to revise it for the fourth edition. The work has been done with consummate ability and makes it certain that the book will maintain its primacy. No man knows the *koine* better than Thumb. He is a master in Sanskrit and in Greek. Dr. L. Cohn has added a discussion of Lexicography which is also of value. There is no book in English the equal of this great production.

A. T. ROBERTSON.

Dreams. By Henri Bergson. Translated, with an Introduction by Edwin E. Slosson. New York: B. W. Huebsch. 1914. 57 pp.

Mr. Bergson is unfailingly interesting. His theory of dreams is no exception to the rule. He says: "The birth of a dream is then no mystery. It resembles the birth of all our perceptions. The mechanism of the dream is the same, in general, as that of

normal perception." In normal perception there is a stimulus—a sensation—which is filled out by more or less relevant memory images, interpreted by the preëxisting mental content and so constructed into a definite perception. Exactly the same process is gone through in dreams, according to Bergson. But the stimuli in dreams are usually the vague splotches of color which appear when the eyes are closed, or chance sounds (maybe the internal sensations of the ears), or other accidental sensations which are not sufficient to awaken the sleeper. Then the process above described takes place, but takes place in a more haphazard and uncontrolled way than in the waking life, and the result is a dream.

It is a very interesting little book.

C. S. GARDNER.

The United States and Peace. By W. H. Taft. Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1914. 182 pp. \$1.00 net.

Ex-President Taft was as President a firm advocate of international peace and is entitled to speak now on the subject. He is in favor of arbitration of all subjects, even questions of honor. It is a pity that the United States Senate refused to ratify the treaties which he secured between this country and Great Britain and France. The present volume is of interest to all citizens with outlook and sympathy.

American Policy in the Western Hemisphere in Its Relation to the Eastern. By John Bigelow. Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1914. 184 pp. \$1.00 net.

Major Bigelow has produced a timely book in view of the present acute interest in Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Colombia, Argentine, Brazil and Chile. He expounds the Monroe Doctrine in its new phase and sets forth also Pan-Americanism. The book is sensible and useful and loyal to all that is truly American.

Stories of Russian Life. By Anton Tchekoff. Translated from the Russian by Marian Fell. Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1914. 314 pp. \$1.35 net.

These stories have a pessimistic tone, for they depict with graphic power the struggles of the Russian peasant. There is a weird pathos in it all and some of the charm of Tolstoi. They are simple in style and directly appeal to the heart.

Carl Hall of Tait. By Everett T. Tomlinson, Author of "The Winner Series," "The Ward Hill Series," "The Blue and Buff Series," etc. Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press, 1914. 282 pp. \$1.00.

Boys will welcome another book by Colonel Tomlinson whose store of stories is exhaustless. This one connects up with the previous Tait school series but, like the rest, is independent. It introduces a new and amusing character. The tone and lessons are wholesome for manly character; but it must be said that in plot and in detail it is both improbable and poorly done.

